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of an act which it administers routinely is afforded judicial deference, even
in matters of first impression." Decisions of the NRC in particular have
carried considerable authority in the courts." The regulatory scheme cre-
ated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 grants an unusual degree
of sweeping authority to the agency. 5 NRC findings of fact will not be
overturned unless it can be demonstrated that they are arbitrary and ca-
pricious." Where the facts are susceptible to two different interpretations,
the agency's decision will not be set aside for lack of substantial evidence. 7
The technical expertise required for such determinations is possessed by
engineers, not judges.
68
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission extends the strict liability concept asso-
ciated with public health and safety legislation to the field of nuclear
power plant licensing. By refusing to read a reliance requirement into its
interpretation of materiality and by holding that scienter is not necessary
to impose liability under section 186, the Fourth Circuit decision sought
to effectuate the overriding purpose of the 1954 Act: protection of the
public welfare in the area of nuclear power. Furthermore, the Fourth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed the sweeping authority of the NRC to render decisions
within its particular expertise.
GRETCHEN CECEILIA FRANCES SHAPPERT
XI. EVIDENCE
A. Hearsay Evidence and the Confrontation Clause
Ideally, to protect the defendant from introduction of untrustworthy
testimony, oral testimony should be given under oath, in the presence of
the trier of fact, and challenged by cross-examination.' Application of the
0 Butz v. Glover Livestock Com. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973). See also Power Reactor
Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396,414-16 (1961);
Great N. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275 (1942); Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d
1212, 1218 (4th Cir. 1974).
1, Cities of Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 441 F.2d 962, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See
also North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
See Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
*6 Id. See also Deutsch v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 401 F.2d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Yellin, supra note 7, at 976.
401 F.2d at 407.
" 4 NRCI at 487.
The solemnity of administration of the oath is thought to encourage the witness to
speak truthfully by emphasizing the criminal consequences of perjury. The observation of a
witness's demeanor allows the trier of fact to evaluate the credibility of his testimony. Fur-
ther, the judicial setting, the possibility of public disgrace, and the presence of the defendant
make it more difficult for the witness to give false testimony. Cross-examination, however, is
considered the most valuable safeguard against introduction of untrustworthy testimony
because the jury directly evaluates the accuracy and truthfulness of the witness's statements
through the opposition's questions. C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 245 at 584 (2d ed. 1972)
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common law rule against admission of hearsay evidence2 generally ensures
compliance with these three requirements. The common law and the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence have recognized, however, that otherwise trustwor-
thy evidence cannot always meet these requirements, and certain excep-
tions based on alternate assurances of reliability have been developed.3 In
criminal proceedings, however, out-of-court declarations admitted through
exceptions to the hearsay rule create a basic conflict with the sixth amend-
ment guarantee' that the criminal defendant has the right to confront the
witnesses testifying against him.5 The Supreme Court, having addressed
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMiK]; see Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible
Imponderables, 47 A.B.A.J. 580, 580-81 (1961).
2 Hearsay is defined in Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the matter asserted." FaD. R. Evw. 801(c). Hearsay necessarily lacks the protections
of oath, presence and cross-examination. Therefore, such declarations are considered so po-
tentially unreliable that the statements cannot be admitted to evidence. McCoRMCK, supra
note 1, § 245 at 581; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1364, 1420 (Chadboum rev. 1974). Federal
Rule of Evidence 802, known as the "hearsay rule", codifies this common law rule against
admission of hearsay evidence.
Common law exceptions to the hearsay rule developed through a balancing process
involving several factors which included the need to receive the evidence, a witness's unavail-
ability, the trustworthiness of the statement, and the risk that the trier of fact will be able
to accurately assess the weight the evidence merits. The hearsay rule does not forbid admis-
sion when the evidence possesses clear circumstantial trustworthiness without cross-
examination, and when necessity requires admission. See Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S.
586 (1924) (statements against co-conspirator); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892)
(dying declarations); Jennings, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 747 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Jennings].
Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 enumerate the common law exceptions to the
hearsay rule with appropriate revisions for more modem and current development. Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Advisory Committee's Notes, 56 F.R.D.
183, 290 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's Notes]. The Rules specifically
eliminate any presumption that hearsay evidence cannot be excluded on other grounds,
thereby preserving the differentiation between the right of confrontation and the rule against
hearsay. FED. R. Evw. 803 & 804. Evidence which qualifies under a hearsay exception may
always be excluded when a defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right is violated or
when admission of the evidence causes denial of his fourteenth amendment right to due
process. Advisory Committee's Notes, supra at 303; see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,
65-66 (2d Cir. 1977); Powell & Bums, A Discussion of the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 8
GoNz. L. REv. 1, 21 (1972).
The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right. to be confronted with witnesses against him. ... U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
, Extensive research of the origin, historical background and development of the sixth
amendment's confrontation clause has not revealed a conclusive interpretation of the framers'
intent. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal
for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CoNN. L. Rav. 529, 532
n.15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Baker]; see Jennings, supra note 3, at 742; Younger,
Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HoFsRA L. Rzv. 32, 32
n.4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Younger]. A strict interpretation of the confrontation clause
clearly would preclude admission of all hearsay testimony. Since admission of hearsay evi-
dence pursuant to specific exceptions was permissible at the time the sixth amendment was
.56319791
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the hearsay-confrontation clause conflict' on several occasions,7 currently
drafted and adopted, a literal construction of the confrontation clause excluding all hearsay
could not have been intended. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 252 at 606-07; see Jennings, supra
note 3, at 746.
While both the hearsay rule and the confrontation right seem to require the appearance
and testimony of witnesses at trial, the Supreme Court has held that the hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause are not co-extensive. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
Although the two protections overlap in many situations, they are not identical. Evidence
admissible under a hearsay exception may violate the defendant's constitutional rights. In
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the trial court admitted the extrajudicial
confession of Bruton's co-defendant under the common law co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule, instructing the jury to disregard the confession in deciding Bruton's guilt or
innocence. Id. at 124. Bruton had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, who had
invoked his fifth amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 124-25. The Supreme Court re-
versed the decision, holding the instruction to the jury was ineffective. Thus, the admission
of the confession denied Bruton's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Id. at 126. Al-
though properly admitted under a hearsay exception, admission of the confession nonetheless
violated Bruton's constitutional rights.
In certain instances, constitutionally admissible evidence may not meet the requirements
of hearsay exceptions. When evidence does not fall under a hearsay exception, the evidence
is declared inadmissible and the constitutional issue generally is not addressed. Thus, cases
in which evidence is constitutionally admissible, although inadmissible under the common
law or the Federal Rules of Evidence, are few in number. Note, Hearsay and Confrontation:
Can the Criminal Defendant's Rights Be Preserved Under a Bifurcated Standard? 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 243, 244 n.7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearsay and Confrontation]; see
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977) (failure to meet notice requirement of Rule
804(b)(5) rendered evidence inadmissible and constitutional objection thus ignored); United
States v. Gonzales, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (since statement inadmissible under
804(b)(5) confrontation clause issue not addressed).
In an initial attempt to distinguish the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule, the
Supreme Court defined confrontation as a right to cross-examination. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965). In Pointer, a witness at a preliminary hearing identified the defen-
dant as the person who had robbed him. Since the court failed to appoint counsel, there was
no cross-examination of the witness. At trial, the prosecution showed that the robbery victim
was unavailable to testify because he no longer resided in the state. Subsequently, the prose-
cution was allowed to introduce the witness's preliminary hearing testimony over the defen-
dant's objection that the admission violated his right to confrontation. Id. at 401-02. The
Supreme Court determined that confrontation was a fundamental element of a fair trial and
for the first time, held this right applied to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 403. The Court reasoned that the admission of the transcript
violated the defendant's constitutional confrontation right which included the opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 407-08. The Court carefully stated, however, that admission
of hearsay evidence does not always violate a defendant's sixth amendment rights simply
because the statements lack the protection of actual cross-examination at trial. If the defen-
dant has the opportunity to complete an adequate cross-examination, the confrontation right
is satisfied. Further, the Court condoned several common law exceptions to the hearsay rule
in which uncross-examined evidence is admissible and stated that the Pointer decision did
not affect the propriety of the exceptions. Id. at 406-07.
The Court could have decided the case on other constitutional grounds, thus avoiding
the confusing hearsay-confrontation conflict entirely. For example, the Court could have
made the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), applica-
ble to preliminary hearings, or based its decision on the premise that due process prevents
admission of hearsay to prove so important an issue as identification. See Younger, supra note
5, at 33. Rather, Pointer marks the beginning of the Court's struggle with the hearsay-
confrontation conflict.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
requires a case-by-case application of a subjective test in which certain
"indicia of reliability" determine the trustworthiness and admissibility of
the hearsay evidence.8 This resolution, however, does not reconcile the
admission of hearsay evidence with the defendant's constitutional confron-
tation right and, as a result, application of the Court's reliability test has
resulted in inconsistent decisions.' The judicial and legislative trend to
Cases following Pointer further illustrate the extent to which the Court equated the
defendant's right to confrontation and cross-examination. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,
725 (1968) (right to confrontation a trial right and includes both opportunity to cross-examine
and occasion for jury to weigh demeanor of witness); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419
(1965) (inability to cross-examine witness denies defendant the right to cross-examination
secured by the confrontation clause).
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), marked the abandonment of the Pointer ration-
ale. In Green, a witness testified against the defendant at a preliminary hearing, subject to
cross-examination. When the witness proved uncooperative at trial, the trial court allowed
the prosecutor to read excerpts of the witness's preliminary hearing testimony into evidence.
People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 149
(1970). Citing Pointer, the California Supreme Court held that the confrontation right re-
quired a contemporaneous cross-examination of a witness before the trier of fact. The court
found that neither the cross-examination of the witness at trial regarding his prior prelimi-
nary hearing testimony, nor the actual cross-examination at the preliminary hearing met the
confrontation standard. Id. at 153.
In vacating the judgment, the Supreme Court held that the admission of the preliminary
hearing testimony did not violate the confrontation clause because the witness was available
for cross-examination at trial. Id. at 161. Further, the witness's statement at the preliminary
hearing was given in an adversarial proceeding, similar to an actual trial proceeding, as
evidenced by the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the witness at that time. Id. at
165. Even if the witness had not been available to testify at trial, the testimony would still
be admissible based on the cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 166. Recog-
nizing that preceding cases focused primarily on situations where statements of unavailable
witnesses were admitted without any cross-examination whatsoever, the Court altered its
earlier position that the confrontation clause requires contemporaneous cross-examination
and characterized cross-examination as a means of demonstrating the reliability of evidence.
Id. at 155. If the requisite level of reliability is shown, the evidence is admissible without
infringement of a defendant's sixth amendment rights. See Younger, supra note 5, at 36-37.
Subsequent to Green, the Court in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), held that the
requisite level of reliability of evidence can be demonstrated without prior or contemporane-
ous cross-examination. According to the plurality opinion, the degree of accuracy guaranteed
by the confrontation clause is met when the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court
statement demonstrate sufficient "indicia of reliability" to establish the trustworthiness of
the evidence. Id. at 89. If the evidence is reliable, trustworthy, and accurate, the opportunity
for cross-examination is not required. Id. The Court defines this subjective standard of
accuracy in terms of a balancing of several variables including the circumstantial reliability
of the evidence, the necessity of admitting the evidence, the possibility that cross-exami-
nation would reveal the unreliability of the statement, and the importance of the evidence
to the defendant's case. Id. at 88-89; see United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); Stewart v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 78, 88 (6th Cir. 1976).
Further, sufficiently reliable evidence is admissible only if it is not crucial or devastating to
the defendant's case. 400 U.S. at 87.
a Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
In United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Garner,
574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit took a liberal approach to the admission of
hearsay evidence. The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded in a similar fact situation that grand
jury testimony is inadmissible. United States v. Gonzales, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). In
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liberalize the admission of out-of-court statements, as embodied in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, further complicates this situation.'"
The Fourth Circuit's recent decisions in United States v. West" and
United States v. Garner2 reflect the confused status of the relationship
between the confrontation clause and admissibility of hearsay evidence. In
these cases, the court held that admission at trial of grand jury testimony
of unavailable witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) did not
violate the defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights.'
3
West involved indictments for drug related offenses. On three separate
occasions, Brown, a police informer,'4 contacted the defendant and ar-
ranged to make heroin purchases. Each time Brown planned a purchase,
agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) organized extensive sur-
veillance.'" Photographs, tape recordings and Brown's signed statements
summarizing the circumstances and events of the transaction documented
each purchase.'" A grand jury subsequently indicted the defendant for
distribution of and possession with the intent to distribute heroin.1 7 Brown
later testified before a second grand jury detailing specific heroin pur-
chases he made from the defendant. The sworn statements that Brown had
signed immediately following each transaction were read into the record,
and Brown periodically affirmed their accuracy and trustworthiness.'"
a case in which the witness did not disclaim the accuracy of his grand jury testimony, the
Eighth Circuit allowed admission of uncross-examined testimony. United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Although decided before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 804(b)(5), the Second Circuit held in
United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), that admission of grand jury testimony
violates the hearsay rule as well as the sixth amendment. While the inconsistent results of
these cases may be attributed to factual distinctions, a basic conflict exists in the interpreta-
tion of the admissibility of hearsay evidence not falling under a traditional exception to the
hearsay rule.
"* The two "residual" exceptions to the hearsay rule, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24)
and 804(b)(5), demonstrate the intent to encourage growth and development within the law
of evidence. Hearsay evidence, not specifically covered by the exceptions listed in Rule 803
or Rule 804 but possessing equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is admis-
sible. See Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 3, at 290.
" 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
12 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 333 (1978).
,3 574 F.2d at 1133; 574 F.2d at 1143.
,1 The police informer in West agreed to assist the Drug Enforcement Agency while he
was in jail charged on a drug violation and under detainer for a parole violation. 574 F.2d at
1133.
15 Id.
16 Id. In West, the police carefully monitored all contacts between their informer and the
defendant. Prior to any meeting with the defendant, the agents searched the informer to
ascertain that he possessed no drugs before approaching the defendant. The police wired the
informer for sound before each purchase and obtained photographs of every meeting. After
the purchases, the informer reported directly to the agents, surrendering the heroin. The
agents again searched the informer to insure he retained no other contraband. Finally, an
agent discussed the circumstances of each transaction with the informer and drafted a sum-
mary which Brown read, corrected and signed. Id.
1" Id.
Is Id. at 1134. In exchange for his grand jury testimony the informer was released from
jail, charges against him were dismissed and his parole was lifted. Id.
[Vol. XXXVI
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Three days later, Brown was murdered.
At trial, the government introduced the pictures, tapes and heroin
obtained from the investigation in which Brown participated. The DEA
officials testified regarding their surveillance roles, and the defendant had
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the agents. The trial court admit-
ted the transcript of Brown's extremely detailed, uncross-examined grand
jury testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (5). In appealing his
conviction to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant contended that Brown's
grand jury testimony did not meet the requirements of Rule 804(b) (5) and
that admission of the uncross-examined testimony violated his constitu-
tional right to confrontation. 9
The Fourth Circuit first analyzed the admission of Brown's testimony
under Rule 804(b)(5). 21 Hearsay evidence admitted under Rule 804(b)(5)
must: (1) be given by an unavailable witness; (2) have circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the first four exceptions 2' enu-
merated in the Rule; (3) be offered as evidence of a material fact; (4) be
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
produced through reasonable efforts; (5) serve the general purposes of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the interest of justice; and, (6) be intro-
duced only upon proper notice to the adverse party. 22 The defendant
argued that Brown's testimony did not meet the requirements of Rule
804(b)(5) because Brown's criminal record clearly indicated an inherent
element of untrustworthiness. Moreover, the defendant contended that the
lack of an opportunity to cross-examine Brown about his record and, more
importantly, concerning the defendant's alleged crimes, substantially in-
Id.
Id. at 1134-35. Cases involving admission of hearsay under Rules 803 and 804 are
analyzed in two steps. First, the evidence must meet all of the specific criteria of the applica-
ble Rule. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81 (2d Cir. 1977). The court must then
decide whether admission of the evidence comports with the sixth amendment. See United
States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 498 (8th Cir. 1976).
The legislative history of Rule 804(b)(5) indicates that Congress intended the courts to
construe the Rule strictly and to apply it sparingly. The House Judiciary Committee deleted
the original draft of the Rule because its application permitted too much discretion. The
Senate Judiciary Committee however, reinstituted the catch-all exception because it was
clearly impossible to foresee and enumerate all possible hearsay exceptions. According to the
Committee, circumstances could arise in which hearsay evidence would possess exceptional
guarantees of trustworthiness but would not be admissible under an established exception to
the hearsay rule. Under Rule 804(b)(5), hearsay evidence of this nature would be permissible
without significant expansion of the common law rule against hearsay. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong. 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 7065-66.
21 Evidence admitted under Rule 804(b)(5) must have a circumstantial degree of trust-
worthiness equivalent to the guarantees of reliability inherent in the Rule's other enumer-
ated exceptions. These codifications of traditional common law hearsay exceptions include:
testimony given at a prior hearing or proceeding in which the party against whom the evi-
dence is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine the witness; state-
ments made by declarant under belief of impending death; statements directly contrary to
the witness's pecuniary or proprietary interest; and statements regarding personal or family
interest. FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(1)-(5).
" FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(5).
1979]
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creased the unreliability of the grand jury testimony.2 The defendant as-
serted that these factors undermined the trustworthiness of Brown's grand
jury testimony and that admission of the transcript under 804(b)(5) was
erroneous.
2
Disagreeing with the defendant's argument, the Fourth Circuit stressed
the inherent trustworthiness of the sworn statements, and also viewed the
agents' observations, the pictures, and tape recordings as independent
assurances of the truthfulness of Brown's grand jury testimony.? The ex-
ceptional corroborating circumstances surrounding the surveillance and
investigation of the defendant gave Brown's testimony a degree of reliabil-
ity substantially exceeding the guarantees inherent in dying declarations,
statements against interest, and declarations of personal or family history,
which are three of the four other admissible forms of hearsay under
804(b) .26
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the lack of an
opportunity to cross-examine Brown prevented the evidence from meeting
the requisite level of reliability specified in Rule 804(b)(5).2 Under the
court's reasoning, the extensive surveillance during the entire investigation
made any deception by Brown of the DEA agents "inconceivable.
'"2
Brown's criminal record also failed to undermine the reliability of the
evidence; Brown assisted the agents solely to avoid further incarceration
and any attempt on his part to deceive the agents or to arouse suspicion
clearly would have been detrimental to his interests. Further, defense
counsel's knowledge of Brown's criminal record afforded the defense an
adequate opportunity to attack the grand jury testimony.29 In the Fourth
"1 574 F.2d at 1134-35.
2 Id. at 1135.
'Id.
2' Id. at 1135; see text accompanying notes 14-17. The court conceded that the grand jury
testimony did not possess the guarantees of trustworthiness which arise from cross or direct
examination and therefore could not satisfy the former testimony exception embodied in Rule
804(b)(1). The court determined, however, that Rule 804(b)(5) only requires trustworthiness
equivalent to any one of the four 804(b) exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. Contra, United
States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 333, 334-35 (1978) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (whether Rule 804(b)(5) was intended to provide case-by-case hearsay excep-
tions or to permit expansion of hearsay by categories remains unsettled); Lowery v. Mary-
land, 401 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd mem., 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1976) (Rule 804(b)(5)
cannot be used when other 804(b) exceptions applicable but unsatisfied).
" 574 F.2d at 1135-36. Cross-examination serves different functions under hearsay and
the confrontation clause. Cross-examination in the context of the hearsay rule insures the
trustworthiness of the evidence. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 185 (1948). Under the confrontation clause, however,
cross-examination provides a method for the defendant to challenge accusations made against
him. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). In West, the Fourth Circuit found that
cross-examination was unnecessary to insure the reliability of the evidence because the exten-
uating circumstances surrounding the case sufficiently guaranteed trustworthiness. The
court; however, failed to address the right to cross-examination as a method of challenge. See
Hearsay and Confrontation, supra note 6, at 266 n.129.




Circuit's view, neither Brown's criminal past nor the lack of cross-
examination sufficiently decreased the reliabilty of the evidence to pre-
clude admission under Rule 804(b)(5).30
Having concluded that the grand jury transcript was admissible under
Rule 804(b)(5), the court addressed the defendant's constitutional argu-
ment that the sixth amendment confrontation clause should have barred
admission of the evidence.3' The confrontation clause does not mandate
exclusion of hearsay evidence in all instances.3 According to the Supreme
Court, if the out-of-court statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability,s
or if the circumstances surrounding admission of the statement provide
the jury with a sufficient basis to judge its trustworthiness,4 admission of
the hearsay evidence does not violate the Constitution. The Fourth Circuit
in West held that the circumstances surrounding Brown's uncross-
examined statements assured reliability of the testimony and provided a
firm basis for evaluation of the credibility of the witness and the truthful-
ness of the testimony by the trier of fact.3 Although cross-examination, as
a method of confrontation, would strengthen or weaken the reliability of
hearsay statements, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine will not al-
ways prohibit admission.36 The court considered the evidence corroborat-
ing Brown's statements to be ample assurance of its trustworthinnss. Ac-
cording to the Fourth Circuit, admission of Brown's testimony did not
violate the defendant's constitutional rights because the evidence pos-
sessed a sufficient degree of reliability.
3Y
In West, the Fourth Circuit attempted to adhere to the Supreme
Court's determination that the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause
are not co-extensive. Courts which have considered the confrontation-
The level of trustworthiness required by Rule 804(b)(5) becomes clear through observ-
ance of the application of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) in different fact situations. Compare
United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977) (Rule 804(b)(5) requirements satisfied
when probability that fraud or misidentification was negligible) with United States v. Bailey,
581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 1978) (evidence inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(5) when peripheral
corroboration insufficient to insure trustworthiness). See also United States v. Gonzales, 559
F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. White, 553 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1977).
3' 574 F.2d at 1136.
n Id. at 1136-37.
13 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
5 74 F.2d at 1136-37. There are several instances at common law where exceptions to
the hearsay rule are allowed and hearsay evidence is admitted on the rationale that the
circumstances surrounding the statement lend sufficient reliability for admissibility. See
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (statement against penal interest held admissi-
ble); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (testimony given at earlier trial by declarant
unavailable at retrial deemed admissible); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (testi-
mony at preliminary hearing admissible since declarant cross-examined at hearing); cf. Doug-
las v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (although against penal interest, out-of-court confession
implicating defendant inadmissible since given under potentially coercive circumstances).
u 574 F.2d at 1136-37.
" Id. at 1137-38.
33 Id. at 1136; see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); note 6 supra.
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hearsay issue acknowledge and emphasize the difficulty of applying the
standards enunciated by the Supreme Court. 9 Traditionally, evidence fall-
ing under a common law hearsay exception was considered constitutionally
admissible because the surrounding circumstances assured a high level of
trustworthiness." According to the Supreme Court, admission of hearsay
is constitutional if the evidence possesses sufficient "indicia of reliabil-
ity."4 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) also bases admission on the
trustworthiness of the evidence." Reliability, therefore, is the primary fac-
tor in determining whether hearsay is admissible under the common law,
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Constitution. Any differentiation
between hearsay and the confrontation clause seems artificial because the
standards which allow admission under a common law or statutory hearsay
exception are effectively equivalent to the Supreme Court standards of
reliability. The Supreme Court, however, has never equated hearsay and
confrontation, 3 and the Court and Congress steadfastly refuse to embrace
the argument that the confrontation clause constitutionalizes the hearsay
rule.4 The Court requires articulation of a theoretical difference between
the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause when in fact, no practical
difference exists. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit in West held that evidence
admissible under Rule 804(b)(5) is not a fortiori admissible under the
Constitution, 5 but the court did not clearly explain why."
The Fourth Circuit also addressed Rule 804(b) (5) and the hearsay-
confrontation conflict in United States v. Garner.47 The defendants in
Garner were charged with drug offenses involving importation of heroin
from Europe. Warren Robinson, indicted for the same offenses as the
Garner defendants, agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense in exchange
for his testimony against the defendants before a grand jury and in any
ensuing proceedings." Robinson testified before the grand jury, implicat-
ing the defendants and detailing the conspiracy involved. Before the defen-
dants' trial, however, Robinson indicated his unwillingness to testify at
11 See note 7 supra; see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 351 (3rd Cir. 1978);
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 65 (2d Cir. 1977).
1 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (prior testimony of deceased witness
admissible at subsequent trial); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (dying declara-
tions admissible).
I Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
2 FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
,1 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
1, See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1977), citing Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes, supra note 3, at 292 (separateness of confrontation clause and hearsay rule must
be acknowledged to prevent "collisions" between the two).
4s 574 F.2d at 1137 n.7.
For examples of judicial inability to articulate a resolution to the hearsay-
confrontation conflict, see United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 498-502 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1974).
' 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1978).
, Id. at 1143.
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trial." His lawyer and the trial court unsuccessfully attempted to secure
his testimony through promise of immunity and threats of contempt. Al-
though Robinson indicated to the court and his counsel that he .might
answer defense counsel's questions on cross-examination, at trial he dis-
claimed the accuracy of his grand jury statements and refused to answer
any further questions. His testimony was interpreted by the court as a
refusal to testify, thus establishing his unavailability." The prosecution
introduced airline tickets, customs declarations, passport endorsements
and hotel records and receipts corroborating Robinson's grand jury testi-
mony. The testimony of other conspirators further supported Robinson's
original grand jury statements. Based on this corroboration, the trial judge
allowed the prosecution to admit the transcript of Robinson's testimony
under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (5) and the defendants subsequently
were convicted."
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendants asserted that the trial
court's admission of Robinson's grand jury testimony had been improper.
The Fourth Circuit did not detail the defendants' argument, but it appears
that the defendants, like the defendant in West, contended that the evi-
dence did not possess the guarantees of trustworthiness generally required
by Rule 804(b)(5). The Gamer defendants also claimed that the admission
violated their constitutional confrontation rights due to the lack of reliabil-
ity and inadequate cross-examination of the witness.5
Relying on West, the Fourth Circuit held that sworn grand jury testi-
mony is admissible under Rule 804(b)(5) when substantial independent
guarantees of trustworthiness are present. Further, Gamer indicated that
the admission of the testimony does not violate the confrontation clause if
the evidence is sufficiently reliable and possesses a basis upon which the
jury may evaluate the trustworthiness of the testimony.53 In the court's
view, the corroborating evidence introduced by the prosecution sufficiently
assured the reliability and trustworthiness of Robinson's grand jury state-
ments, despite his disclaimer." The court, however, did not distinguish the
AN Id. Whether the reluctance of the witness in Garner to testify at trial was caused by
the defendants' threats is idle speculation. The court contended that the witness's testimony
at trial did not indicate that his grand jury testimony was false, but rather that he was
unwilling to incriminate the defendants in any way. Id. This point is particularly important
because Rule 804 will not allow admission of hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a result
of a defendant's wrongdoing. FED. R. EVID. 804. Under Rule 804(a)(2), a declarant is consid-
ered unavailable if he refuses to testify by wrongfully invoking a privilege, ignoring judicially
granted immunity or remaining silent in defiance to a court order to answer. If the declarant
is absent or refuses to testify, however, as a result of the defendant's wrongdoing, the declar-
ant is not considered unavailable. FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(2); see United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (defendant waived constitutional
right to confront witness when he assured that witness would not testify through threats and
intimidation).
" 574 F.2d at 1143.
' Id.
52 Id. at 1144.
3 Id.
1' But see United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 333,
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elements which allow admission under Rule 804(b)(5) from the require-
ments which satisfy the confrontation clause. Therefore, in Garner, as in
West, the Fourth Circuit analyzed only the evidence corroborating the
hearsay statements, and limited the usefulness of the Garner opinion to
subsequent comparisons with other fact situations.
Judge Widener strongly dissented in both West55 and Garner"6 from the
majority view that circumstantial reliability of hearsay evidence can be
a substitute for a defendant's right to confrontation. ',' Confrontation, in
Judge Widener's opinion, was deemed a trial right which is satisfied only
by cross-examination."' Judge Widener contended that the essence of the
hearsay-confrontation conflict does not concern the truthfulness of the
evidence, but whether there has been adequate confrontation to satisfy the
requirements of the sixth amendment. 9 While uncross-examined evidence
may be admissible under the common law when exceptional standards of
trustworthiness are met, circumstantial trustworthiness is not a substitute
for a defendant's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers. Judge Widener asserted that the confrontation right is a regula-
tion of trial procedure, and the sixth amendment therefore requires cross-
examination of an accusing witness. Due to the absence of cross-
examination in West and Garner, Judge Widener argued that the confron-
tation clause absolutely prohibits admission of the grand jury testimony.
The Courts of Appeals have been unable to agree on a proper resolution
of the hearsay-confrontation issue' and differing interpretations must be
addressed by the Supreme Court if inconsistent results are to be avoided.2
In an effort to fashion a more workable resolution to this conflict, the Court
may consider several theories. 3 The Court could, for example, adopt a view
which equates confrontation with cross-examination. Under this view, to
satisfy the confrontation right testimony admitted under a specific hearsay
334-35 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
574 F.2d 1131, 1139 (4th Cir. 1978) (Widener, J., dissenting).
5 574 F.2d 1141, 1147 (4th Cir. 1978) (Widener, J., dissenting).
See generally text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
574 F.2d at 1139.
Id.
to Id. at 1140-41.
,, See text accompanying note 9 supra.
62 Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joined, wrote a dissent to the
Supreme Court's denial for certiorari in Garner. Justice Stewart, author of the Dutton opin-
ion, contends that the conflict in interpretation of the confrontation clause must be resolved
by placing specific limitations on the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the Constitution. 99 S. Ct. 333, 334. The majority of the Court however did not
agree. Id. at 333.
0 For detailed discussions of possible resolutions to the hearsay-confrontation conflict,
see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-98 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Baker, supra note 5,
at 539; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56
TEXAS L. Rav. 151 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Graham]; Read, The New Confrontation -
Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 42 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Read]; Westen,
Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases,
91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 598-601 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Westen].
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exception must be cross-examined, regardless of "indicia of reliability."' 4
Such a theory, however, precludes admission of all hearsay evidence 5 and
clearly undercuts the liberalization of admission of hearsay currently sup-
ported by the courts and legislature."8
An alternate theory, in which the confrontation clause acts as an addi-
tional safeguard assuring truthful testimony, is more pragmatic. If admis-
sible hearsay is supported by substantial indications of reliability, 7 and
the trier of fact has sufficient basis for determining the accuracy of the
evidence, 8 the confrontation right is satisfied under the alternate ap-
proach." As demonstrated in West and Garner, one disadvantage of this
approach is the current lack of a specific definition of reliability. Further,
this theory fails to distinguish the protections of the hearsay rule from the
confrontation clause since the factors determining admission under hear-
say exceptions and the sixth amendment are essentially the same."0
The Supreme Court also could adopt an entirely new interpretation of
the confrontation clause7 in which the availability of witnesses triggers its
applicability.7 2 Under this theory, the sixth amendment guarantees con-
frontation of accusing witnesses only when the witnesses are available to
testify at an adversarial proceeding. When the unavailabilty of a witness
is established, any admission of a related hearsay statement must meet the
fifth73 and fourteenth74 amendment requirement that trials be conducted
in accordance with the due process of law.75 This determination is based
64 574 F.2d 1131, 1140 (4th Cir. 1978) (Widener, J., dissenting); see Read, supra note 63,
at 42.
1 But see Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (confrontation clause does not
preclude admission of all extra-judicial declarations).
11 See Baker, supra note 5, at 539. In the practical application of a theory in which
confrontation requires cross-examination, some common law hearsay exceptions would have
to be recognized. However, the existence of a catch-all, residuary exception such as Rule
804(b)(5), which allows continual development and creation of exceptions to the hearsay rule,
would be inappropriate. The Supreme Court in its original draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence included a residuary exception and it seems unlikely that the Court would adopt
an approach to confrontation which would negate its own provision. See Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes, supra note 3, at 322. See also Read, supra note 63, at 42.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
' The theory which characterizes the confrontation clause as a safeguard assuring truth-
ful testimony is a combination of the Supreme Court's reliability test in Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970), and Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in the same case, 400 U.S. 74,
93 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The result is similar to the standard applied by the Fourth
Circuit in West and Gamer. See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
70 See text accompanying notes 38-46 supra.
71 See note 4 supra.
7 See Westen, supra note 63, at 597.
" The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall. . . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.. . . "U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
7, The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall. . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . . "U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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on the circumstantial guarantees of reliability involved in the case. Al-
though the ambiguous "reliability" test still plagues this interpretation of
the confrontation clause,7" reliability is no longer considered a substitute
for the defendant's sixth amendment rights. Rather, it is an assurance that
the defendant's fifth and fourteenth amendment rights are satisfied. 7
Under this theory, the sixth amendment does not automatically constitu-
tionalize or completely bar admission of hearsay under traditional excep-
tions.7 Admission of the evidence is constitutional when the due process
requirements are met.
The Fourth Circuit's decisions in West and Garner advance the theory
that reliability of evidence is a substitute for cross-examination and con-
frontation of the unavailable witness. In both cases, the levels of indepen-
dent corroborating facts were extraordinarily high79 and the court's deci-
sion to allow admission of the grand jury transcripts did not seem to deny
the defendants a realistic opportunity to uncover inconsistencies in the
testimony. Under the court's reliability analysis, however, most cases in
which the conflict between hearsay and confrontation arise may not be
decided so easily. Under West and Garner, the outcome of future cases
involving less compelling evidence is uncertain due to the current interpre-
tation of the sixth amendment, the Supreme Court's ambiguous
"reliability" test, and the confusion surrounding the applicability of Rule
804(b)(5).
ELIZABETH TuRLEY
B. Impeachment by Prior Acts and Convictions
Impeachment, the cross-examination of a witness to attack his credibil-
ity, I is currently the target of considerable judicial inquiry.2 Although im-
peachment by prior acts3 and convictions4 did not exist at early common
7 See Graham, supra note 63, at 195-96 n.200.
" See Westen, supra note 63, at 599.
"' See Graham, supra note 63, at 197-98.
7, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978); 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1978).
1 See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
I The Supreme Court recently has inquired so repeatedly into the use of prior acts and
convictions for impeachment purposes that the Court has placed this area of evidence within
a nearly complete framework of constitutional interpretations. See Bray, Evidence of Prior
Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional Restrictions, 28 U. MIAMi L. Rav. 489
(1974); see, e.g., Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
(1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967);
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). See generally Note, Evidence - The Use of Prior
Uncounseled Convictions for Impeachment, 22 DEPAuL L. REv. 680 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Uncounseled Convictions].
I Prior acts are instances of past misconduct by the witness which are used to attack his
credibility. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 42.
1 Prior convictions differ from prior acts in that the witness was convicted for the particu-
lar misconduct. Id. § 43.
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law because a conviction rendered a witness incompetent to testify,5 mod-
em statutes and case law no longer discriminate against convicted wit-
nesses.' The impeachment of defendant-witnesses by prior acts and convic-
tions has received this attention because of the significant possibility that
the defendants' right to a fair trial has been infringed. Using prior acts and
convictions to impeach a defendant-witness may divert the attention of the
trier of fact from the present charges to past misconduct by the defendant.
Once admitted, it is improbable that such evidence will be used solely to
determine credibility.' In addressing the problem, some statutes pertain-
ing to the admission of this type of evidence employ balancing tests to
determine whether the probative value8 of the witness's prior acts and
convictions outweighs their prejudicial impact 9 to the defendant.'0 Several
courts have also required that evidence used for impeachment bear on the
moral turpitude or veracity of the witness." Absent statutory guidelines,
5 MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 43 at 84. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129
(8th Cir. 1924) (convicted witness incompetent to testify); Ky. REv. STAT. tit. 15 § 421.090
(1970) (repealed 1975) (disqualifying any person convicted of certain crimes, other than the
defendant, from testifying).
9 See note 11 infra; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-49 (1969) (person convicted of crime
not excluded as a witness).
See notes 9 & 44 infra.
The probative value of a prior act or conviction used for impeachment purposes is
suspect. See generally Ladd, Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176
(1940). Illustrative of the uncertainty of their value are the persuasive arguments opposing
the use of prior convictions. Opponents of the use of convictions to attack credibility assert
that a past conviction merely proves that at some time in the past, the defendant was found
guilty of an illegal act under unknown circumstances for which he was later sentenced. See,
e.g., Krauser, The Use of Prior Convictions as Credibility Evidence: A Proposal for
Pennsylvania, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 291, 292 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Krauser]. The use of prior
convictions to attack credibility has also been questioned on constitutional grounds. See
Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction
Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. Cmn.
L. REv. 168 (1968).
Proponents of the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes argue that the
convictions indicate at least that the defendant has been capable of illegal conduct in the
past. In addition, prior convictions may evidence a pattern of general dishonesty. Most
importantly, prior convictions for crimes which bear on honesty can be viewed as one of the
few tangible pieces of evidence of the veracity of the defendant. See, e.g., Krauser, supra at
293.
1 The possible prejudicial impact on the defendant lies in the use by the jury of the prior
acts or convictions for purposes other than assessing credibility, such as evidence of a pro-
pensity to commit crimes. McCORMICK, supra note 1, § 42; see CoNF. R. No. 93-1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S.CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7103 (recognizing
that prior convictions may improperly influence trier of fact to convict on basis of prior
record).
'o See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608 & 609. See generally McCoRMmcK, supra note 1, § 43 (Supp.
1978).
" See, e.g., State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp. 656, 384 A.2d 386 (1978) (applying
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-145 (West 1977) only to prior acts or convictions which bear on
veracity); Taylor v. State, 278 Md. 150, 360 A.2d 430 (1976) (limiting MD. CTs. & Jun. PRoc.
CODE ANN., § 10-905 (1974) to evidence which tends to show witness cannot be believed);
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 228 S.E.2d 688 (1976) (interpreting VA. CODE § 19.2-
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courts must turn to the common law of their jurisdiction to discern admis-
sibility criteria.
In North Carolina, prior acts are admitted for impeachment purposes
under a common law evidentiary rule.'2 When a defendant elects to testify
at trial, he surrenders his privilege against self-incrimination and can be
impeached by questions relating to any specific acts of misconduct. " The
North Carolina prior misconduct admission rule affords the state an oppor-
tunity to "sift the witness" in order to ascertain his credibility." Although
the rule requires prosecutors to exercise "good faith"''5 and to provide an
evidentiary basis which supports their impeachment questions, trial
judges often blur these requirements when determining the admissibility
of prior acts and convictions." The prior misconduct admission rule also
prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to explain or refute a witness's
answer. 7 Furthermore, the defendant must establish any violation of the
rule.'"
Inf Watkins v. Foster,'5 the defendant Foster contended that the failure
of the prosecutor to meet the requirements of the North Carolina prior
269 (1975) to require that evidence must involve moral turpitude or bear on veracity). But
see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-12 (West 1976) (from which several courts have read "conviction
of any crime" literally).
12 See 1 STANSBURY'S NoRTH CAROLINA EViDENCE § 111 (Brandis Rev. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as STANSBURY]. For an expanded summary of the prior misconduct admission rule, see
State v. Thomas, 35 N.C. App. 198, 201, 241 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1978).
'3 State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 275, 200 S.E.2d 782, 795 (1973); see notes 24 & 57 infra.
See STANSBURY, supra note 12, at 103 n.13 (1978 Supp.) for an interpretation of the Foster
court's reading of the self-incrimination issue. The Foster court interpreted the North Caro-
lina rule as allowing reference to "specific acts of criminal and degrading conduct" when the
defendant has taken the stand, regardless of their bearing on the witness's veracity. Id. at
275, 200 S.E.2d at 794. In State v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 154, 177 S.E.2d 754 (1970), the
number of times the defendant's drivers license had been suspended was admitted into
evidence for impeachment. 177 S.E.2d at 755-56. Supporters of the rule emphasize the cer-
tainty it affords trial judges in deciding which prior acts to admit. STANSBURY, supra note 12,
§ 111 at 344. The same rule also applies to the admission of convictions in North Carolina.
Id. § 112. For a critique of the rule allowing any type of prior acts and convictions to be
admitted for impeachment use in North Carolina, see Note, Evidence - Traffic Violations
to Impeach a Witness, 46 N.C. L. REV. 969 (1968).
" State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 275 S.E.2d 537 (1973); accord, State v. McKenna, 289
N.C. 668, 224 S.E.2d 357, remanded on other grounds sub nom. McKenna v. North Carolina,
429 U.S. 912 (1976).
15 State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 546, 547, 23 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1943). Good faith seems to require
simply an absence of malice. See State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. App. 439, 165 S.E.2d 15, cert.
denied, 275 N.C. 263 (1969).
11 The two prerequisites of good faith and a supporting evidentiary basis for questions
directed at impeaching the witness are often blurred so that good faith is shown by proving
an evidentiary basis for the questions. Professor Stansbury summarizes the prior misconduct
admission rule as requiring only that the questions be asked "in good faith upon justifying
information." STANSBURY, supra note 12, § 112 at 345; see note 38 infra.
,1 State v. Cross, 284 N.C. 174, 178, 200 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1973). Extrinsic evidence in
addition to being excluded from explaining or refuting a witness's answer, also cannot be
admitted to establish good faith on the part of the prosecutor. See note 63 infra.
, State v. Moore, 27 N.C. App. 284, 286, 218 S.E.2d 499, 500 (1975).
" 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978).
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misconduct admission rule resulted in the denial of a fair trial.20 The,
Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that impeachment questions directed to a
defendant-witness concerning his prior acts, based on weak collateral in-
dictments and untempered by limiting instructions to the jury, constituted
a violation of due process of law. 2' During trial in a North Carolina state
court on an indictment for first degree burglary,22 the prosecutor im-
peached Foster by asking him a series of questions concerning whether he
had broken into other homes on six previous occasions?2 The six alleged
prior acts were the subject of six other indictments returned by the grand
jury against Foster.24 Foster's attorney objected to each question.2 The
only evidence offered by the state was a photographic enlargement of Fos-
ter's fingerprint which had been found on a flowerpot in the burglarized
home.2 After the jury found Foster guilty of burglary,2 he appealed to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the prior misconduct admis-
sion rule was not satisfied and that the rule was unconstitutional.? The
court upheld the validity of the rule and affirmed the verdict, finding that
the requirements of good faith and a supporting evidentiary basis under
the rule were satisfied because of the indictments.
29
A federal district court, however, granted Foster's writ of habeas cor-
pus,'" circumventing the discretionary decision3' of the state trial court.
" Id. at 505.
21 Id. at 507.
2 An earlier conviction on the burglary charge in the North Carolina Supreme Court had
been reversed because prejudicial hearsay testimony had been elicited from Foster on cross-
examination. State v. Foster, 282 N.C. 189, 192 S.E.2d 320, 327 (1972).
1 570 F.2d at 504-05.
24 Id. at 503. The fact that Foster had been indicted for the alleged prior acts was not
revealed to the jury. Id. at 504-05; see note 57 infra.
2 570 F.2d at 504-05. A failure to object would represent a waiver of opportunity to assert
the possible error in a habeas corpus proceeding. Rivera v. Warden, 431 F. Supp. 1201, 1204
(E.D.N.Y. 1977). The absence of an objection also waives the defendant's right to assert a
breach of the prior misconduct admission iule in North Carolina. State v. Fountain, 282 N.C.
58, 191 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1970).
2s 570 F.2d at 502-04. According to the state, an unidentified intruder, who a witness said
"looked like a man," struck the witness and fled with some items from the home. Although
no fingerprints were uncovered at the window used to gain entry, the police were able to
identify Foster's fingerprint on a flowerpot found in the living room of the burglarized home.
Id. At trial, the only evidence admitted by the prosecution was an enlarged picture of this
fingerprint because the original had been lost. Id. at 503, 504 nn.1 & 2.
" Id. at 505.
n Id. at 506 n.4.
" State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782, 795 (1973). The North Carolina Supreme
Court later reaffirmed the confidence it placed in indictments as an evidentiary basis for
impeachment questions in Foster. State v. Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975),
modified on other grounds, 428 U.S. 902 (1976). Reversing the lower court's ruling in Lowery,
the North Carolina Supreme Court identified a pending indictment as an "ample basis" to
sustain the good faith requirement. Id. at 708, 213 S.E.2d at 261. The court re-emphasized
this reasoning by subsequently relying on Lowery to summarize the state evidentiary rule.
State v. McAllister, 287 N.C. 178, 184, 214 S.E.2d 75, 81 (1975).
31 The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976), provides that habeas
corpus is available only to those persons detained "in violation of the Constitution or laws or
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Federal habeas corpus review of state criminal court evidentiary rulings is
limited to errors of a constitutional dimension.32 Since a violation of an
evidentiary rule alone does not indicate unlawful detention of the pris-
oner,3 Foster could not have secured habeas corpus review merely by alleg-
ing a breach of the North Carolina prior misconduct admission rule."
Therefore, Foster alleged that he was denied due process by the application
of the rule. In granting habeas corpus, the federal court reasoned that
allowance of the impeachment questions not only violated the evidentiary
rule, but also denied the defendant due process because of the scarcity of
evidence presented at trial."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant habeas
corpus.3 The court focused its inquiry on whether the prosecutor had exer-
cised good faith in cross-examining Foster.3 7 Although the prosecutor's
treaties of the United States." See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976); United States
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 158 (1923). See generally Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). Until
recently, defendants increasingly relied upon habeas corpus as an easy method to obtain post-
conviction review by a federal court of a state court decision. Note, Applying Stone v. Powell:
Full and Fair Litigation of a Fourth Amendment Habeas Corpus Claim, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
Rav. 319, 319 (1978). Fourth amendment claims which have been fully litigated at the state
level, however, are now excluded from habeas corpus review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
494 (1976). For a discussion of the implications of the Stone and other recent decisions on
future habeas corpus review, see Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6 HoPSTRA L. Rv. 297 (1978).
31 A discretionary decision by a trial judge is immune from subsequent reversal absent
the rare finding of a gross abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d
517, 529 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976). The admission of prior acts and
convictions under the prior misconduct admission rule is left to the discretion of the trial
court. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971). The North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that a discretionary decision concerning cross-examination is not
subject to reversal unless the defendant shows that the improper decision influenced the
verdict. State v. Currie, 293 N.C. 523, 529, 238 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1977), quoting State v. Wad-
dell, 289 N.C. 19, 26, 220 S.E.2d 293, 299 (1975).
12 The reversal of a state court's finding is unusual because a determination of a state
court is presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1976); see Grundler v. North Carolina,
283 F.2d 798, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 917 (1960).
3 Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973); see Venetzian v. Hall, 433 F. Supp. 960,
963 (D. Mass. 1977); Victory v. Bombard, 432 F. Supp. 1240, 1252-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3 Anderson v. Maggio, 555 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1977). The inadmissible evidence must
comprise a critical factor in the trial and its admission must be above the level of harmless
error. Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953, 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932 (1972). Foster
was required to allege a breach of the Constitution because a violation of a state evidentiary
rule is not a violation of a law of the United States. See note 30 supra.
" Foster v. Watkins, 423 F. Supp. 53, 55 (W.D.N.C. 1976). The district court applied
the harmless error test outlied in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), which
requires that for a constitutional error to be deemed harmless, the reviewing court must find
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp.
934, 946 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (even if prosecutor acted in bad faith, there was no constitutional
error in impeachment questions concerning an indictment); Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F. Supp. 31
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (overwhelming circumstantial evidence rendered improper impeachment
questions harmless).
" 570 F.2d at 507.
" Id. at 506. Foster did not argue that the North Carolina evidentiary rule was unconsti-
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
questions referring to prior acts were based on indictments, the court rea-
soned that this alone was insufficient to show an evidentiary basis for the
questions2 After investigating the factual basis for the indictments, the
court found that they lacked adequate evidentiary support. 9 By electing
to prosecute the burglary indictment, the court theorized that the state
probably determined that this indictment was the strongest of those re-
turned against Foster. 0 In addition, every indictment which allegedly con-
stituted a proper evidentiary basis for the impeachment questions had
been dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence either before or soon after
Foster's trial.4 Finding that the indictments provided an insufficient evi-
dentiary basis for the impeachment questions, the court concluded that
the prosecutor lacked good faith.2 Thus, the prosecutor failed to meet the
requirements of the North Carolina prior misconduct admission rule and
the questions concerning the prior acts were improper. 3 In addition, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that the absence of limiting instructions to the
jury" aggravated the already prejudicial impact of the improper ques-
tutional on its face, but rather that the prosecutor's bad faith violated his right to due process.
Brief of Appellee at 11, Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978).
Is 570 F.2d at 506. The Fourth Circuit asserted that in order to meet the good faith
standard, the prosecutor's questions must be supported by facts. Although the court blurred
the two requirements of the prior misconduct admission rule, see note 16 supra, it noted that
the state approved of this restatement of the rule. 570 F.2d at 505. Both federal and North
Carolina courts have long recognized the evidential basis requirement. See, e.g., United
States v. West, 460 F.2d 374, 375 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Randolph, 403 F.2d 805,
806 (6th Cir. 1968); Gross v. United States, 394 F.2d 216, 222 (8th Cir. 1968); Lee Won Sing
v. United States, 215 F.2d 680, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1954); State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 524, 82
S.E.2d 762, 767 (1954).
31 570 F.2d at 505-06.
41 Id. at 505, citing State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973) (Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting).
1' 570 F.2d at 506. The court concluded that dismissal prior to trial of one of the indict-
ments relied on to support a question designed for impeachment shed doubt on the prosecu-
tor's good faith. The North Carolina Supreme Court was not advised of this dismissal or of
the later dismissals prior to its decision.
42 Id.
' See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
" Evidence of prior acts or convictions on cross-examination is admitted for impeach-
ment purposes only. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 59. North Carolina follows the widespread
practice of instructing the jury on the limited utility of prior acts and convictions evidence.
STANSBURy, supra note 12, § 108. Absent a request by the defendant, a North Carolina trial
court has no duty to give limiting instructions. State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 698, 202 S.E.2d
750, 768 (1974); cf. State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 516, 212 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1975) (absence of
curative instructions concerning improper comments on defendant's failure to testify requires
reversal).
The primary motive behind the use of limiting instructions seems to be to establish a
compromise between the respective interests of the prosecutor and the defendant.
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 59. Usually short and precise, limiting instructions direct the
jury to consider the admitted evidence solely to judge the defendant's credibility. In addition,
limiting instructions usually warn the jury against making any inference that the defendant
is more likely to have committed the crime charged simply because of his past misconduct.
See generally Naylor, Section 609 of the Nebraska Evidence Rules: A Need for Clarification,
57 NEB. L. Ray. 26, 34-42 (1978).
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tions. 5 The failure of the state trial court to instruct the jury on the limited
use of impeachment evidence, however, was not sufficient to raise a consti-
tutional issue necessary to invoke habeas corpus review."
Because of the need to discover the existence of a constitutional issue,
the Fourth Circuit evaluated the quantity of evidence offered to establish
Foster's guilt to determine if due process had been violated.17 Assessing the
amount of evidence presented as "slim," the court noted that the prosecu-
tor conceded this estimation."8 The court then characterized the allowance
of the impeachment questions as the admission of improper "facts."49 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that these
facts contributed to Foster's conviction and thus constituted harmful and
therefore reversible error.59
Although limiting instructions are commonly included in trial procedure, their value is
suspect. See Note, The Limiting Instruction - It's Effectiveness & Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv.
264, 265 (1966). In Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
556 (1932), Judge Learned Hand characterized limiting instructions as a "mental gymnastic"
which is beyond the jury's intellectual ability. The concurring opinion in Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) termed the belief that
limiting instructions could overcome the prejudicial effect of the admitted evidence a "naive
assumption" based upon "unmitigated fiction." A possible virtue of these jury directives is a
reduction in the number of mistrials, new trials, and reversals for prejudice because of the
confidence placed in the curative powers of the instructions. Note, Other Crimes Evidence
at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YAmE L. J. 763, 765 (1961). See generally Note,
Evidence-Admissibility of Prior Convictions to Impeach a Witness, 44 TENN. L. REv. 401,
410 (1977) (judge's confidence in limiting instructions could influence his decision to admit
possibly prejudicial evidence).
"5 570 F.2d at 506; see note 44 supra.
46 Rivera v. Warden, 431 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). A breach of the prior
misconduct admission rule is also not sufficient to invoke habeas corpus review. See text
accompanying note 34 supra.
11 570 F.2d at 506. The majority explained that it was reviewing the scarcity of the
evidence, not its sufficiency, in order to determine the extent of the prejudicial impact of the
improper questions. Id. at 506 n.6; see text accompanying note 34 supra & note 51 infra.
Nevertheless, the dissent in Foster charged that the majority impermissibly judged the weight
of the evidence in reaching its decision. 570 F.2d at 507 (Widener, J., dissenting).
570 F.2d at 506.
" Id. The Fourth Circuit may have characterized the impeachment questions as "facts"
for two reasons. First, the court emphasized the absence of limiting instructions to the jury
which should have confined the use of the prior acts to the issue of credibility. See note 44
supra. Second, the "facts" characterization facilitated the court's evaluation of the questions'
impact on the trial in reviewing the district court's finding of a due process violation. See
note 50 infra.
11 570 F.2d at 507. The Fourth Circuit relied on two "harmless error" tests to determine
whether the improper impeachment questions constituted a violation of due process. Id. at
506 n.6. Under the test outlined in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963), the
reviewing court must decide whether there is a "reasonable possibility" that the inadmissible
evidence contributed to the conviction. A finding that there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence contributed to the conviction, regardless of the sufficiency of the proper evidence
admitted, requires a holding that the error was harmful. Id. The Supreme Court in Harring-
ton v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), took a different route in constructing a general harmless
error test. Under the Harrington test, the focus of the reviewing court is not on the improper
evidence, but rather on the remaining evidence admitted against the defendant. If this other
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The protracted reasoning of the Fourth Circuit stems from a dilemma
the court faced in reaching its holding in Foster." The North Carolina
Supreme Court, which constructed the framework of the state's prior mis-
conduct admission rule, concluded that the good faith requirement of the
rule had been satisfied,5 and Foster did not assert that the rule itself was
unconstitutional.13 Faced with reversing the highest state court's interpre-
tation of its own rule or declaring the rule unconstitutional despite the
acquiescence of the defendant, the Fourth Circuit focussed on the quick
dismissal of the indictments which supposedly established the prosecutor's
good faith. 4 Emphasizing the importance of this "new" evidence,5 5 the
Fourth Circuit created the opportunity to justify its conclusion by reapply-
ing the prior misconduct admission rule to the impeachment of Foster.
While tacitly affirming the findings of the North Carolina Supreme
Court and leaving the evidentiary rule intact, the Fourth Circuit made an
important refinement of the rule. The court implicitly relied on that part
of the rule which proscribes the prosecutor from referring specifically to
unrelated indictments during cross-examination. 7 Although the prosecu-
tor complied with the specific acts provision of the rule, 8 the Fourth Cir-
evidence is "so overwhelming" that the jury would have convicted the defendant regardless
of the inadmissible evidence, the error is termed harmless. Id. at 254. These two tests reach
the same result when, as in Foster, the other evidence in the case is far from overwhelming.
See 395 U.S. at 255-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Sound reasoning was crucial in Foster because the court was reversing a discretionary
decision by a state trial court. See notes 31-32 supra.
' See notes 22-28 supra.
See note 37 supra.
" See text accompanying note 41 supra.
The Fourth Circuit also noted that the absence of limiting instructions had not been
addressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. 570 F.2d at 506.
" See 570 F.2d at 506.
57 In State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174, 182 (1971), the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a witness may not be impeached by questions referring to prior or
current indictments for other criminal offenses. When a defendant is impeached to show his
possible bias or prejudice, however, referrence to indictments is permissible. Alford v. United
States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931). Since the Williams decision only modified the prior miscon-
duct admission rule, a witness may still be impeached by questions about whether he has
committed specific acts in the past. State v. Gainey, 280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d 874,879 (1972);
see State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 517, 212 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1975); State v. Gurley, 283 N.C.
541, 547, 196 S.E.2d 725, 730 (1973). For an example of an application of the Williams rule,
see State v. Stimpson, 279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168, 173 (1971).
In adopting the rule enunciated in Williams, the North Carolina Supreme Court over-
ruled the long-standing doctrine of State v. Maslin, 195 N.C. 537, 143 S.E.2d 3 (1928). See
Note, Evidence - Inadmissibility for Impeachment Purposes of Evidence Showing Prior
Arrest or Indictment, 8 WAxz FOREST L. Rav. 467, 468 (1972). North Carolina now follows the
majority of other jurisdictions concerning the impeachment use of indictments. State v.
Williams, 279 N.C. at 673, 185 S.E.2d at 151; see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 30 Md. App. 512,
352 A.2d 371, 373-74 (1976); Johnson v. State, 82 Nev. 338, 418 P.2d 495, 496-97 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 475 Pa. 605, 381 A.2d 438, 439 (1977); State v. Goodwin, 29 Wash.
2d 276, 186 P.2d 935, 936 (1947); cf. Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(California prohibits reference to indictments or specific acts of misconduct to impeach a
witness).
n 570 F.2d at 504-05. In accordance with the Williams rule, the prosecutor asked only
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cuit expanded the provision by questioning the sufficiency of the indict-
ments used as the evidentiary basis supporting impeachment questions.-9
The court did not specify a procedure to implement this additional suffi-
ciency inquiry, however, leaving unresolved the question of whether the
inquiry should be made at the trial or appellate level.60 In addition, the
court failed to identify the specific level of proof necessary to sustain the
use of indictments in this form of impeachment.6 '
A voir dire hearing in which the prosecutor can establish the eviden-
tiary basis of his good faith contention would allow North Carolina courts
to incorporate effectively the new Foster inquiry into the determination of
good faith.2 The North Carolina rule bars the admission of extrinsic evi-
dence at trial, thereby foreclosing any possibility that the prosecutor could
prove his challenged good faith absent a hearing. 3 Only if the court deter-
mined that good faith depended primarily on indictments would the court
whether the defendant had committed specific acts. Id.; see note 57 supra.
1' Because a constitutional issue necessary to institute habeas corpus review cannot be
derived solely from an error involving limiting instructions, see text aceompanying note 46
supra, the court's holding on the good faith issue cannot be dismissed as dictum.
,0 The Fourth Circuit did not identify when inquiry into the adequacy of the indictments
should be performed, but inferred by silence that the inquiry should be made at the trial level
where, supposedly, good faith is already established. Application of the new inquiry at the
trial level, however, is unrealistic. The inadequacy of the indictments relied on in Foster was
confirmed only through the post-trial dismissals. See text accompanying note 41 supra. Thus,
the trial court operated with a limited supply of facts, unable to respond to the dismissals or
any other weakness of the indictments exposed subsequent to trial. See note 63 infra. In
addition, evaluation at the trial level would burden the trial court with the arduous task of
investigating and prejudging collateral indictments.
91 Judge Widener dissented in Foster, arguing that if the dismissal of the collateral
indictments for lack of sufficient evidence is fairly read as indicating only that the prosecutor
lacked sufficient evidence to convict Foster, then the majority opinion requires the prosecutor
to possess evidence proving the misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 F.2d at 507-08
(Widener, J., dissenting). Although the force of the dissent's conclusion is diminished by the
obvious weakness of the collateral indictments in the instant case, see text accompanying
notes 38-39 supra, the dissent does identify the absence of the formulation of what constitutes
an acceptable level of proof necessary to comply with the majority opinion. See note 66 infra.
'2 The court in State v. Heard, 262 N.C. 599, 138 S.E.2d 243 (1964) employed a voir dire
hearing to determine good faith. This procedure was ignored by North Carolina courts until
State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970). In Gaiten, the defendant specifically
contended that the trial court erred by not determining whether the prosecutor's impeach-
ment questions were supported by facts and asked in good faith. 176 S.E.2d at 781. Since
this determination is discretionary, the court concluded that where the record is silent on the
issue of good faith, the trial judge should be presumed to be correct. 176 S.E.2d at 782. In
State v. Daniels, 35 N.C. App. 85, 89, 239 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1978), the court reiterated the
Gaiten reasoning. The Gaiten court acknowledged the possibility of a voir dire good faith
hearing, stating that it was permissible, but not required. 176 S.E.2d at 782.
13 In Foster, the court noted that the prosecutor could not use any extrinsic evidence to
support his implied assertion of good faith. 570 F.2d at 506. Barring extrinsic evidence insu-
lates the court from valuable information. Thus, exemplifying the problem, the dissent to the
second opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court was able to argue only that the record
"tends to negate" the prosecutor's good faith, rather than asserting that the record does




investigate the adequacy of the indictments." Counsel for the defendant
would learn of the prosecutor's reliance on indictments by attending the
heariAg."1 If the indictments subsequently appeared to be superficial or
offered in bad faith," the defendant could argue a breach of the prior
misconduct admission rule through appeal. The appellate court, taking
advantage of the intervening time period to analyze the evidentiary value
of the indictments, could then properly evaluate the use of the indictments
to support impeachment questions." A hearing to determine good faith
thus constitutes an appropriate vehicle to supplement the current eviden-
tiary rule in North Carolina with the new Foster requirement."
Despite the uncertainties in Foster, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of the good faith requirement strengthens the safeguard against prosecu-
torial abuse of the employment of impeachment questions." Without the
modification of the current rule, prosecutors could secure superficial in-
" During the voir dire hearing, a weighing test, similar to those Telied on in the harmless
error tests, see note 49 supra, should be employed to evaluate the actual reliance on indict-
ments. Thus, if the supplemental evidence alone could support a finding of good faith, further
inquiry into the indictments would be unnecessary. In Foster, the court apparently inquired
into the adequacy of the indictments because the indictments were the only ascertainable
evidentiary support for the impeachment questions. 570 F.2d at 505.
' Adversarial argument by the defendant concerning the adequacy of the indictments
offered to support good faith should not be entertained at the good faith hearing. Sufficient
information concerning the validity of the indictments is normally not available to support
intelligent discussion at the hearing stage of litigation. See note 60 supra. Moreover, such
argument also would lengthen the hearing.
11 Implicitly, the Foster decision requires that the proof necessary to support the indict-
ments be greater than that required to convince a grand jury to issue the indictments. See
text accompanying note 38 supra. Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, would
be too stringent a standard since this would equate the admission of evidence with the burden
of proof necessary to convict. See note 61 supra. Therefore, courts should make case-by-case
evaluations within these parameters.
" In addition to avoiding the disadvantages in review at the trial level, see note 60 supra,
an inquiry by the appellate court has several advantages. The intervening time period be-
tween trial and appellate review would disclose subsequent dismissals of indictments as in
Foster. See text accompanying note 41 supra. Inquiry on appeal would also limit judicial
inquiry to those few cases in which events subsequent to the defendant's conviction cast doubt
on the prosecutor's good faith.
" Good faith determination hearings would probably slow down trials. The correspond-
ing benefits of better informed admissibility decisions and the easy implementation of the
indictment sufficiency inquiry, however, outweigh the disadvantage. Moreover, the use of a
hearing would complement due process of law by disclosing impeachment evidence to the
defendant. The defendant would seem to have the due process right to be confronted with
the evidence used to support his impeachment because this evidence is also being used
against the defendant to enhance the possibility of a finding of guilt. See generally Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
" See text accompanying note 14 supra. The Foster decision can be narrowly read and
dismissed as simply a product of the case's unique factual situation. See note 29 supra.
However, the additional inquiry into indictments used to support good faith mandated by
the Foster court remains a sound improvement on the prior misconduct admission rule and
should be implemented. Although most jurisdictions are in accord with North Carolina's
restriction on impeachment questions which refer directly to indictments, no other jurisdic-
tion has incorporated the additional inquiry outlined in Foster. See note 57 supra.
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dictments solely to buttress the evidential support for impeachment ques-
tions. In addition, the court's strengthening of the good faith requirement
affirms the importance the court places in the good faith prerequisite for
the admission of prior acts and convictions.7 0 The Foster decision should
encourage prosecutors to act in strict compliance with the prior miscon-
duct admission rule.
In addition to common law evidentiary rules similar to North Caro-
lina's prior misconduct admission rule,7 legislatures have enacted statutes
dealing with the admission of prior acts and convictions. 72 Congress
adopted Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to govern the use of
prior convictions to impeach a witness in federal courts.73 Under Rule 609,
evidence of a felony conviction is admissible if the probative value of the
conviction 4 outweighs the prejudicial impact 75 of its admission.76 Convic-
tions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are automatically
70 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
See note 11 supra.
3 Because the United States Supreme Court only recently ruled allowing the use of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971),
prior rules and decisions allowing their admission were clouded with uncertainty. See
generally Note, The Dilemma of a Defendant Witness in New York: The Impeachment
Problem Half-Solved, 50 ST. Jon's L. REv. 129 (1975). Prior to the enactment of Rule 609 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence governed admissibil-
ity of prior convictions for impeachment purposes in federal court. No evidence of a prior
conviction was admissible under Rule 21 unless the witness first introduced evidence solely
to support his own credibility. In addition, Rule 21 barred the admission of any conviction
for the purpose of attacking credibility unless it involved dishonesty or false statement.
UNIFORM RuiEs OF EVIDENCE 21 (1953) (superseded by Rule 609 (1974)). See generally Com-
ment, California's Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach a Criminal Defendant, 9 U.S.F. L.
REv. 491, 493-94 (1975).
In Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court abandoned the strict
guidelines of Rule 21 and entrusted the admission of prior convictions to the discretion of the
trial judge. The Luck court constructed guidelines for the admission of prior acts and crimes
as follows:
In exercising discretion in this respect, a number of factors might be relevant, such
as the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the age and
circumstances of the defendant, and, above all, the extent to which it is more
important to search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's
story than to know of the prior conviction.
Id. at 769 (footnote omitted); see Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
Rule 609 was an intensely debated compromise between the supporters of Rule 21 and
the Luck rule, incorporating much of the Luck-Gordon reasoning. 120 CONG. Rlc. H12,257
(daily ed. Dec. 1974); see United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (extensive
recitation of legislative history of Rule 609); see generally United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d
188 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
867 (1977); United States v. Cole, 491 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1974); 3 J. WEI~sTEIN & M. BERGER,
EvmENCE § 609[03] (1977); Savikas, New Concepts in Impeachment: Rule 609(a), Federal
Rules of Evidence, 57 CHI. B. REc. 76, 77 (1975).
11 See note 8 supra.
73 See note 9 supra.
71 FEn. R. Evm. 609(a)(1).
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admissible. 77 Under Rule 609(b), however, any conviction which is more
than ten years old is inadmissible unless the probative value of the convic-
tion substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact.78
In United States v. Cavender7 the Fourth Circuit held that in order
to comply with Rule 609(b), the trial court must make an on record finding
of the specific facts and circumstances supporting its admissibility deci-
sion.80 After indictment for possession of an unregistered firearm in 1973,81
the defendant Cavender sought to suppress the admission of his 1951 con-
viction for sodomy, 1955 conviction for a probation violation, 1961 convic-
tion for forgery and 1970 conviction for the interstate transportation of a
stolen motor vehicle.12 The trial court denied Cavender's motions to sup-
press each of the prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609(b)3 without in-
cluding its reasoning on the record." As a result of the denial of his mo-
tions, Cavender decided not to testify at trial in order to prevent the
presentation of his record to the jury." On appeal to the Fourth Circuit
77 FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(2).
7s FED. R. EvIm. 609(b).
71 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 532.
83 28 U.S.C. § 5861(c)(f)(i) (1976).
82 578 F.2d at 531. Cavender moved to suppress the prior convictions at two pretrial
admissibility hearings and after the government had presented its evidence at trial. Brief for
Appellee, United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1978).
a 578 F.2d at 529-30. Since Cavender was charged in 1973, the 1970 conviction for
interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle did not come within the protective ambit
of Rule 609(b). The ten year period under the rule is computed from the more recent of either
conviction or release from prison for that conviction. FED. R. Evm. 609(b). Arguably, since
time spent in prison is a period of rehabilitation, society should not penalize the prisoner by
excluding the period of incarceration in the ten year period computation. Thus, the time
period should be computed solely from the date of conviction. See, Glick, Impeachment by
Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 the Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District
Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 330, 343 (1970). Exclusion of the tim of incarceration when
computing the ten year period, however, may place too much confidence in the penal system.
See Krauser, supra note 8, at 310. Instead of being rehabilitated, the prisoner may simply
have little opportunity to engage in criminal activities. Id. Judge Widener, concurring in
Cavender, proposed that the court should be allowed to consider a string of convictions if the
last conviction occurred within the previous ten years. 578 F.2d at 539-40. See generally
Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L. J. 125,
144 (1972).
" The only on record reference by the Cavender trial court to the admissibility decision
stated:
The Court would be inclined to overrule the motion under the particular facts here
when you consider the type of offense of which the defendant was convicted, those
are matters that the Court should take into consideration in making the d~termina-
tion. In view of all the circumstances, I think the Court would overrule the motion.
Record, vol. 6, at 208.
" Brief for Appellant, United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1978). Cavender
faced a dilemma since if he elected to testify, his prior convictions would have been admitted
and the jury might have used the evidence to determine guilt. See note 44 supra. By deciding
not to testify, however, Cavender's silence could possibly have been used by the jury to infer
guilt. See McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 43. A detailed study empirically confirms the defen-
dant's dilemma, revealing that defendants with no criminal record testified in all but 9% of
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following a jury verdict of guilty, 6 Cavender contended that the trial
court's refusal to suppress those prior convictions that were more than ten
years old constituted reversible error."7
The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court, noting that Rule 609(b)
requires the trial court to substantiate its admissibility decision with spe-
cific facts and circumstances.' Additionally, the Fourth Circuit found sup-
port for its position in the legislative history of Rule 609(b). The legislative
history stated an intent that convictions over ten years old were to be
admitted "very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances." 9 The adjec-
tive "substantial" in the Rule 609(b) balancing test also indicates the
congressional intent to limit the discretion granted to the trial court in
admitting such convictions. The Fourth Circuit determined that the in-
tended constraint on discretion could be satisfied only through well-
documented admissibility findings which would serve to prove the validity
of the trial court's decision.' The court also noted that the legislature
clearly intended the finding of the trial court, accompanied by supporting
facts, to appear in the trial record.2 Adding that on record findings are
necessary for meaningful appellate review,9" the Fourth Circuit concluded
that on record findings and supporting facts are required of trial courts
under Rule 609(b).1 Because of this procedural mistake, the Cavender
court held that the trial court erroneously admitted the defendant's prior
convictions over ten years old. 5
The Fourth Circuit also made a specific inquiry into the trial court's
admission of the 1951 sodomy conviction. Explaining that the probative
value of a prior conviction depends upon the nature of the conviction itself,
the court decided that for a conviction to be admissible, it must bear on
the issue of whether the jury should believe the witness. 7 Moreover, the
court reasoned that since sodomy does not involve untruthfulness, deceit,
the cases studied, while defendants with records did not testify in 26% of the cases studied.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERIcAN JURY 146 (1971).
" 578 F.2d at 530.
" Id. The pretrial hearings, see note 81 supra, adequately complied with the additional
requirement under Rule 609(b) that a party must declare his intention to use prior convictions
which are more than ten years old for impeachment by sending advance written notice to the
adverse party. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
" FED. R. Evw. 609(b).
89 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 7062 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
578 F.2d at 532.
Id.
92 SENATE REPORT, supra note 89, at 7062.
,3 578 F.2d at 532; see Dorsynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 452-53 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (on record findings should be required from lower courts interpreting Federal
Youth Corrections Act to aid appellate review); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495,
506-07 (4th Cir. 1973) (administrative agency decisions must contain a factual basis and full
record for meaningful appellate review).
578 F.2d at 532.
Id. at 534 n.21.




or falsification, and the admission of a sodomy conviction creates a sub-
stantial prejudicial impact, the admission of the sodomy conviction consti-
tuted a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court." Thus, the court
held that the sodomy conviction was inadmissible on both procedural and
substantive grounds.9
The Fourth Circuit then investigated the ramifications of the trial
court's procedural and substantive mistakes on the defendant's right to
due process. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the trial court's refusal to
grant Cavender's repeated motions to suppress his prior convictions over
ten years old denied him the opportunity to testify.00 In addition, the court
appraised the evidence against Cavender as "purely circumstantial."''
Consequently, the court concluded that the jury's judgment may have
been swayed substantially by the evidential errors"2 and therefore re-
manded the case for a new trial.
0 3
In applying Rule 609(b) to the admission of the sodomy conviction, the
Cavender court failed to delineate adequately the relationship between
Rules 609(a) and 609(b).101 Rule 609(a) permits convictions for crimes in-
volving dishonesty or false statement to be admitted autmomatically."°
Convictions for crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year are also admissible if the probative value of their admission out-
weighs the prejudicial impact.' Rule 609(b) merely screens the admission
of otherwise admissible prior convictions. Since the remoteness of a convic-
tion detracts from its impeachment value, the 609(b) balancing test adds
the requirement that the probative value of a conviction over ten years old
must substantially outweigh any prejudicial impact.' Thus, convictions
which satisfy the 609(b) balancing test need not necessarily involve dishon-
esty or false statement.' The Fourth Circuit, however, treated the involve-
90 Id. see text accompanying notes 78 supra & 104-08 infra.
" 578 F.2d at 535; see text accompanying notes 95 & 98 supra.
'" 578 F.2d at 535. The denial of a motion to suppress the admigsion of prior convictions
results in a sharp increase in cases where a convicted defendant elects not to testify. See note
85 supra. The admission of even the most prejudicial convictions, however, in no way affects
the defendant's right to testify. See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 43 at 89. Despite
the important distinction between in fact and per se denials, the Fourth Circuit stated
specifically that the admission of the prior convictions "denied the opportunity" of the
defendant to become a witness, thereby clouding the issue. 578 F.2d at 535.
"1 578 F.2d at 535.
12 Id. The court reasoned that since the testimony of the defendant may have signifi-
cantly influenced the jury, the absence of testimony by the defendant must be considered.in
evaluating the effect of the error. Id.
I The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court harmless error tests enunciated in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), see note 35 supra, and Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) to determine the propriety of a new trial. Under the Kotteakos
test, the trial court views the entire situation rather than only the specific error, to determine
whether the error substantially swayed the verdict. Id. at 765.
'o See 578 F.2d at 536-37.
' FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(2); see United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348,358 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(1); see United States v. Miller, 478 F.2d 768, 769 (4th Cir. 1973).
"7FED. R. Evon. 609(b).
"' See United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977).
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ment of dishonesty or false statement in the conviction as a prerequisite
for admission under Rule 609(b).111 Despite the apparent confusion, the
court's reasoning would justify a finding that the probative value of the
sodomy conviction does not substantially outweigh the prejudicial impact
of its admission.
By holding that the trial court's failure to make its findings on the
record rendered the 1951 sodomy, the 1955 probation violation, and 1961
forgery convictions inadmissible, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize the
value of the hearings which were devoted solely to the admissibility of the
convictions."9 The trial court apparently devoted considerable time and
thought to the decision to admit the convictions.' Recent circuit court
decisions suggest that such hearings comply with the purpose of Rule
609(b)."2 The Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial court ruling which admitted
prior convictions under Rule 609(b) without making an explicit finding on
the record, emphasizing that the trial court had the rule before it when
making the admissibility determination." 3 The Seventh Circuit identified
a hearing held by the trial court as the major factor influencing its affirma-
tion of a trial court's off the record decision to admit prior convictions
under the rule."' The hearings in Cavender met and probably exceeded the
procedural requirements of these other circuits by including both a discus-
sion of the facts of the case and the construction of Rule 609(b)Y1
In each of the other circuits' apparently contrary holdings, however, the
courts expressed a decided preference for on record findings by the trial
court." ' To this extent the holding of the Fourth Circuit comports with the
interpretations by other circuits of Rule 609(b) as well as with the legisla-
'01 See 578 F.2d at 534.
110 See note 82 supra.
"I The admissibility hearings included complete adversarial arguments by both parties.
Brief of Appellee, United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1978).
"I Although creating a record for appellate review is important, see note 93 supra, the
purpose of the rule, arguably complied with by the Cavender hearings, is to insure that the
exceptional nature of the admission of a conviction under the rule is impressed on the mind
of the trial judge. See United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977); United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025
(1976); text accompanying notes 88-92 supra.
"I United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977). Placing considerable importance
on the physical presence of a copy of Rule 609(b) in the trial court during the admissibility
decision, the Fifth Circuit contended that this demonstrated that the trial court actually
construed and applied the rule to the facts of the case. Id. at 785.
"I United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1976). The Seventh Circuit specifi-
cally identified the facts related to the trial court through the arguments of counsel at the
admissibility hearings as the foundation of its reasoning. Id. at 928.
I' See note 111 supra. The Fourth Circuit's finding that the sodomy conviction was
substantively inadmissible, however, see text accompanying notes 96-99 supra, is an adequate
basis for reversal regardless of whether the court's conclusion dismissing the value of the
admissibility hearings is erroneous. See note 50 supra.
Il Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits inferred that explicit on record findings were
"probably" contemplated by Congress and will soon be mandatory. United States v. Cohen,
544 F.2d at 785; United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d at 929.
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tive intent."7 Requiring on record findings is a logical and well-supported
advance in the application of Rule 609(b) and should be implemented, as
in the Fourth Circuit, as a regular practice of trial court procedure. Adher-
ence to the Cavender holding will insure compliance with the purpose of
Rule 609(b) and provide the necessary record for meaningful appellate
review.
When convictions are invalidated after being admitted in another trial
to impeach a defendant-witness, the appellate court must make an addi-
tional inquiry into the conviction to discern the reason for its invalida-
tion."" Contributing to the problem of review is the uncertainty which
stems from the few and seemingly inconsistent United States Supreme
Court decisions addressing the use of constitutionally imperfect evidence
for impeachment purposes."' The Supreme Court first specifically ruled on
the problem arising from the impeachment use of prior convictions which
were void at the time of their use or were subsequently invalidated in Loper
v. Beto.'10 In Loper, the Court prohibited the prosecutor from impeaching
a testifying defendant with convictions which were invalidated because the
defendant was not represented by counsel.' 2' The Supreme Court earlier
held, in United States v. Tucker,12 that uncounseled convictions could not
be used to influence the imposition of a discretionary sentence.t2 The
"I The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Rule 609(b) to require on record findings by the
trial court complements the legislative history of the rule. See text accompanying notes 88-
92 supra. Moreover, in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia interpreted its earlier Luck decision, see note 72
supra, as contemplating an on record finding by the trial court.
"I The additional inquiry into the conviction is mandated by Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473 (1972). See note 139 infra.
" See generally Comment, Constitutional Law - Impeachment by Unconstitutionally
Obtained Evidence - The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule - People v. Taylor, 34 Omo ST.
L. J. 706 (1973). In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), the Supreme Court held that
where a defendant affirmatively resorts to perjury on the belief thathis credibility is beyond
challenge, the government is not constitutionally prohibited from using evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment to impeach the defendant. Id. at 65. In Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court concluded that a prior inconsistent statement ob-
tained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could be used for impeachment
where the defendant testified differently at trial. 401 U.S. at 226. See generally Dershowitz
& Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J. 1198 (1971). In response to Harris, Dean McCormick
concluded that if the defendant testifies and otherwise inadmissible evidence is relevant to
his credibility, the evidence will be admissible for impeachment purposes. McCoRMICK, supra
note 1, § 178. But see Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); note 139 infra.
' 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
121 Id. at 483.
', 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
'- Id. at 447. In Tucker, the Supreme Court sought to prevent the erosion of the holding
of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) by the use of uncounseled convictions in
sentencing. 404 U.S. at 448; see Comment, Due Process at Sentencing: Implementing the
Rule of United States v. Tucker, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Due
Process at Sentencing]. The Gideon Court held that absent an intelligent waiver, counsel
must appointed for all persons who are charged with a serious crime and are unable to retain
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application of, and relationship between, these Supreme Court cases
guided the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in a recent decision concerning the
impeachment use of subsequently invalidated convictions.
In Grandison v. Warden,'24 the Fourth Circuit found that the Loper
ruling was inapplicable to the facts of Grandison. In Grandison, the defen-
dant's prior convictions were invalidated because the defendant was ex-
cluded improperly from juvenile court jurisdiction, while in Loper the prior
convictions were invalidated because the defendant lacked counsel.'1
Since the trial court failed to furnish a certificate attesting that the void
convictions did not influence the imposition of sentence, however, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial court contravened the Supreme
Court's decision in Tucker.'21 During a state court trial for sodomy and
assault, the prosecutor impeached the defendant Grandison by questioning
him regarding his prior convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon,
assault, attempted excape, and unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon.'2
Although Grandison advised the trial court that he had filed a petition for
federal habeas corpus which challenged the validity of those convictions,
the court admitted the prior convictions for impeachment and sentencing
purposes.'1 After Grandison was convicted in state court on the sodomy
and assault charges, 2 9 the federal district court granted Grandison's writ
of habeas corpus, invalidating the prior convictions.' 3D The district court
noted that although the convictions were for crimes committed when the
defendant was sixteen, a Baltimore procedural rule in force at the time
excluded sixteen and seventeen-year-olds from juvenile court jurisdic-
tion.' 3 ' The federal court granted habeas corpus since the Baltimore rule
had been held invalid subsequent to Grandison's earlier convictions on the
ground that no legitimate reason existed for excluding Baltimore youths
from the eighteen year old age limit of the Juvenile Court Act of Mary-
land." Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit gave the invalidation of the rule
retroactive effect.'1 Grandison immediately filed another petition for fed-
counsel. 372 U.S. at 339. This holding stemmed from the Court's conclusion that the right to
counsel is a fundamental right and essential to a fair trial. Id. at 340-42.
124 580 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1978).
"I Id. at 1240.
12 Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1234.
' Id. at 1233. The Baltimore trial court admitted the contested convictions on the basis
of a previous denial of state habeas corpus. In petitioning for state habeas corpus, Grandison
had relied on Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D.Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir.
1971); see text accompanying notes 131-133 infra. The state judge denied the petition on the
ground that Grandison's constant misrepresentations of his age estopped him from asserting
the protection of Long. 580 F.2d at 1232.
1" 580 F.2d at 1233.
' Grandison v. Warden, Civil No. HM 75-1724 (D.Md., filed June 9, 1976).
' ' 580 F.2d at 1232.
'3 The Baltimore rule was invalidated in Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D.Md.
1970), affl'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
"I Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
A similar statutory restriction on access to juvenile court was recently struck down by the
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eral habeas corpus, contending that the use of the subsequently invalida-
ted convictions at his sodomy and assault trial violated his right to due
process.' The federal district court rejected Grandison's petition on the
grounds that the use of the void convictions for impeachment and sentenc-
ing purposes constituted harmless error.'
3 5
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Grandison contended that the use of
the invalidated convictions for impeachment and sentencing purposes vio-
lated his rights to due process and equal protection.13 Finding that the
defendant demonstrated no evidentiary error and thus experienced no
deprivation of constitutional rights, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of habeas corpus.'37 The court recognized that the
Loper holding was another of several Supreme Court decisions which
sought to insure that the right to counsel would not be diluted."' The
Fourth Circuit concurred with the Loper Court's finding that the principle
barring the use of uncounseled convictions to prove guilt is vital because
a violation of the right to counsel goes "to the very integrity of the fact-
finding process."'' Since the jurisdictional error in Grandison did not
Tenth Circuit in Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) which was held to be retroactive
in Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974).
lu Grandison v. Warden, 580 F.2d at 1235. While Grandison's petition was pending, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed his convictions for sodomy and assault, Grandi-
son v. State, No. 80 (Ct. Spec. App., filed October 26, 1976), on the ground that the grant of
the federal writ of habeas corpus voiding the earlier convictions did not retroactively invali-
date the trial court's evidentiary ruling. Id. slip op. at 9.
135 Grandison v. Warden, No. HM 76-1590 (D.Md., filed July 18, 1977). The court applied
the harmless error test outlined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See note 35
supra. The district court reasoned that the use of the void convictions was harmless error
because of the strong evidence against Grandison. Moreover, the court reasoned that because
the crime was allegedly committed in prison, the jury would probably assume that the
defendant had been involved in prior criminal activity even without the admission of the prior
convictions. Grandison v. Warden, No. HM 76-1590, slip op. at 10 (D.Md., filed July 18,
1977).
In Grandison v. Warden, 580 F.2d at 1232; see U.S. CONST. amend. X1V. In order to
invoke federal habeas corpus review, the defendant must allege errors of a constitutional
magnitude. See text accompanying note 33 supra. In the case of a mere evidentiary error,
the defendant must first establish the error and then show that the error deprived him of due
process through an application of a harmless error test. See note 50 supra.
The Fourth Circuit initially addressed the state's argument that Grandison had waived
his right to a juvenile classification because he had consistently mispresented himself as being
nineteen or twenty years of age. See note 127 supra. Although the court decided that the issue
was moot because the state did not appeal the earlier grant of federal habeas corpus under
Long, see text accompanying notes 129-32 supra, the court strongly implied that such a waiver
could have been found. 580 F.2d at 1237-38.
1" 580 F.2d at 1241; see note 30 supra.
In See note 139 infra. The right to counsel doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See note 123 supra.
'" Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1972). The Supreme Court explained that the
effect of an absence of counsel on the integrity of the fact-finding process was the stimulus
for subsequent decisions like Loper. Id. The Court decided Loper on the basis of its earlier
holding in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) which involved the use of an uncounseled
conviction under a Texas statutory recidivist provision. See Uncounseled Convictions, supra
note 2, at 683. In Burgett, the prosecutor attempted to use the uncounseled conviction to
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infringe on the fact-finding process,'40 the Fourth Circuit determined that
the uncounseled conviction rule was inapplicable."' In addition, the court
noted a general trend against applying the uncounseled conviction rule to
convictions which are used for impeachment, but are void for reasons other
than a right to counsel violation."'
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Grandison's attempt to extend the
application of the uncounseled conviction doctrine.' Grandison argued
secure more severe punishment under the recidivist statute. 389 U.S. at 115. To prevent the
dilution of the Gideon holding, see note 123 supra, the Supreme Court held that this use of
the void conviction would deprive the defendant of due process of law. In so deciding, the
Court reemphasized the principle that an uncounseled conviction in no way proves guilt. Id.
In Loper, the Court reasoned that using uncounseled convictions to impeach the defen-
dant's credibility at least implies that the defendant is guilty of committing the offense for
which the defendant was tried without the assistance of counsel. 405 U.S. at 483. Therefore,
the Court concluded that even if the Burgett holding was not originally contemplated to reach
the context of impeachment, there was no overriding distinction which would bar such an
extension. Id. See generally Comment, Constitutional Law - The Use of Uncounseled Prior
Convictions to Impeach Defendant's Credibility Deprives Defendant of Due Process of Law
Where Such Use Might Influence the Outcome of the Case - Loper v. Beto, 22 DRAKE L.
REv. 398 (1973); Comment, Constitutional Law - Invalidity of Prior Uncounseled Convic-
tions for Impeachment Purposes - Loper v. Beto, 7 SUFFOLK L. REv. 174 (1972).
11* Grandison relied on Lambert v. Maryland, No. HM 74-404 (D.Md., filed March 7,
1975) and Douglas v. Warden, 399 F. Supp. 1 (D.Md. 1975) to support his contention that
Loper applied to convictions which are void because of the wrongful denial of access to
juvenile court. Grandison v. Warden, 580 F.2d at 1239. In Lambert, the court found that the
use of prior convictions voided for this jurisdictional error was barred along with uncounseled
convictions for impeachment purposes . The court, however, found the error to be harmless.
Id. at 1239. The district court's holding was weakened when the same court later decided that
the fact-finding distinction between errors involving the absence of counsel and those involv-
ing jurisdiction is valid and "speaks for itself." United States v. Mason, 68 F.R.D. 619, 624-
25 (D. Md. 1975). While Grandison relied on Douglas, that case actually helps explain the
fact-finding distinction upon which the Fourth Circuit relied. The Douglas court noted that
while convictions which offend Gideon are per se void, 399 F. Supp. at 9, those which offend
Long are void only if other defendants were allowed beneficial procedures unavailable to this
defendant. Id.
"1 580 F.2d at 1241. The Fourth Circuit relied on United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65
(3rd Cir. 1977) to support the proposition that the use of the void convictions for impeach-
ment purposes does not constitute error where the fact-finding process is not impugned. In
Graves, the prosecutor impeached the defendant with a prior conviction for auto larceny
during a trial which resulted in a conviction for making a false statement on a gun registration
form and of moving the gun in interstate commerce after a felony conviction. Id. at 82. On
appeal, the defendant contended that the larceny conviction was constitutionally void be-
cause he had been improperly denied the opportunity to be tried in a juvenile court. Id.
Recognizing that Loper was a "sequel" to the cases concerned with protecting the right to
counsel, see note 139 supra, the Third Circuit specifically refused to extend Loper to the facts
before it. 554 F.2d at 82.
"1 580 F.2d at 1241; see e.g., Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973) (refused to
extend Loper to conviction void under fourth amendment); von Lusch v. State, 279 Md. 255,
368 A.2d 468 (1977). But see Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 1969) (extended
Burgett to conviction void under fourth amendment). See generally United States v. Cole,
463 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
"I Grandison v. Warden, 580 F.2d at 1239-40.
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that the adjudication of delinquency is another "critical stage" in the
judicial process"' and that there is no valid distinction between the adjudi-
cation of delinquency and the critical stages that activate the right to
counsel.4 5 Although the Fourth Circuit conceded the importance of the
adjudication of delinquency, " 6 the court reaffirmed its position that the
determination of juvenile status neither pertains to nor affects the fact-
finding process, the crucial factor in applying Loper to curtail impeach-
ment by prior convictions. "7
Notwithstanding this finding, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case in
part because the trial court failed to furnish the district court with a
certificate stating that the void convictions did hot influence its imposition
of sentence.4 8 The trial court's error resulted from its non compliance with
the Fourth Circuit's procedure for implementing the directive of United
States v. Tucker.' In response to a petition by Grandison asserting a
violation of Tucker, the trial court was required to state unequivocally that
the sentence imposed was not influenced by the void convictions.' 0 If the
trial court determined that the sentence would have been different absent
knowledge of the convictions, the court would be required to resentence the
petitioner if the prior convictions had been or were later invalidated for
want of counsel.'' In Grandison, the trial court stated only that the use of
the void prior convictions did not contribute to the conviction, without
"I Id. at 1239. Grandison's contention that the adjudication of delinquency is a critical
stage in criminal proceedings, however, does have support and merits consideration. In Kem-
plen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970), the court concluded that "nothing can be more
critical than determining whether there will be a guilt determining process in an adult-type
trial." Id. at 174; accord, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Russell v. Parratt, 543
F.2d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1976); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 1973).
I' 580 F.2d at 1239. The Supreme Court has searched repeatedly for critical stages where
substantial prejudice inheres in judicial proceedings to determine if counsel is necessary to
insure that the rights of the defendant are adequately protected. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
"I Grandison relied on Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 922 (1973), in support of his contention that the adjudication of delinquency is a
critical stage in criminal.proceedings. Acknowledging the existence of support in Woodall for
this theory, the Fourth Circuit dismissed it as dictum because the case was directed at
determining the retroactive nature of Long, not the use of void convictions for impeachment
purposes. 580 F.2d at 1240.
"' 580 F.2d at 1240.
"' Id. at 1243.
" The Supreme Court in Tucker did not establish a procedure for the implementation
of its holding. See Due Process at Sentencing, supra note 123, at 115; text accompanying note
123 supra.
'5' Stepheney v. United States, 516 F.2d 7, 9 (4th Cir. 1975). In Stepheney, the Fourth
Circuit modified the circuit's procedure for implementing Tucker by requiring the trial court
to state unequivocally that it had not been influenced by the void convictions at sentencing.
516 F.2d at 9; see Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1973); Due Process at
Sentencing, supra note 123, at 1124-27.
"1 483 F.2d at 118. If the prior convictions have not been voided, the trial court should
dismiss the petition as premature. Id.
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mentioning sentencing.'52 Although the state argued that the record failed
to show whether the trial court considered the void convictions when sent-
encing the defendant, the Fourth Circuit concluded that an affirmative
statement by the trial court was required.
5 3
The Fourth Circuit's findings in Grandison are inherently contradictory
because the court treated the Loper and Tucker branches of the uncoun-
seled conviction doctrine'54 as if they grew from different trees.,5 The court
ignored the important requirement that the challenged conviction be in-
validated for want of counsel when it remanded the case because of a
violation of the procedure designed to prevent the influence of an uncoun-
seled conviction on sentencing.' 8 In applying Loper to the same set of facts,
however, the court refused to extend this Supreme Court case to convic-
tions which were not uncounseled.'57 In applying Loper and Tucker, courts
should avoid the logical inconsistency of the Fourth Circuit's opinion. Be-
cause of the strong ties of both cases to the uncounseled conviction doc-
trine, the preferable route would be to restrict their application to those
cases void under the doctrine. In addition, allegiance to the "fact-finding"
distinction' 8 outlined by the Fourth Circuit will prevent the unnecessary
exclusion of useful impeachment evidence solely because of minor eviden-
tiary errors by the trial court.
ALAN A. SANT'ANGELO
"' Grandison v. Warden, 580 F.2d at 1242.
"5 Id., citing Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1978). In Strader, the trial court
filed a certificate setting forth the facts at trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (1976) which
allows admission of such a certificate into a federal habeas corpus proceeding. In the certifi-
cate, the trial court recognized the uncouseled conviction, but stated that it "felt" that the
knowledge had no effect on its sentence determination. 571 F.2d at 1266. The Fourth Circuit
considered the certificate ambiguous because the trial judge did not state positively that the
sentence imposed was uninfluenced. Id. at 1267; accord, Goodson v. United States, 564 F.2d
1071, 1072 (4th Cir. 1977); Locklear v. United States, 549 F.2d 313, 313 (4th Cir. 1976); Wren
v. United States, 540 F.2d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1975).
,s See note 137 supra.
' The Fourth Circuit recently acknowledged the common origin of the Loper and Tucker
decisions in Tolliver v. United States, 563 F.2d 1117, 1120 n.7 (4th Cir. 1977), where it stated
that Loper and Tucker "held that convictions in violation of a right to counsel could not be
used to impeach the defendant at trial or relied on at the time of sentencing." The Ninth
Circuit, in Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976), recognized the close
relationship between these Supreme Court cases and refused to fall into the contradiction
which plagues the Grandison decision. The defendant in Tisnado argued that since Beto v.
Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969) extended the Burgett decision to a conviction void
because of fourth amendment violations, there was no reason not to extend the Tucker
decision to convictions void for reasons other than right to counsel violations. Id. at 457 n.4.
The Ninth Circuit, recognizing the uncounseled conviction origin of both cases, refused to
accommodate the defendant. Id.
'"I See text accompanying notes 136-147 supra.
,57 See text accompanying notes 148-153 supra.




More than eight decades ago, the Supreme Court established an evi-
dential doctrine relating to the admissibility of hearsay statements, as
evidence of a declarant's then existing state of mind.2 This concept, known
as the Hillmon doctrine, 3 has been incorporated into the Federal Rules of
Evidence' by the "state of mind" exception 5 to the hearsay rule.' The
Fourth Circuit recently examined the Hilimon doctrine and its codification
in Rule 803(3), 7 but misapplied the concept to the facts and issues of
United States v. Jenkins.8 In Jenkins, the Fourth Circuit held that the
admission into evidence of the transcripts of a telephone conversation
between two persons, at the perjury trial of a third person, was proper
under Rule 803(3).' The admissibility of this evidence was conditioned
upon limiting its use to prove the intent of one of the parties to the conver-
sation."0 Even with this condition, however, the limits of Rule 803(3) have
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evw. 801(c). Additionally, a statement is defined as "(1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion." FED. R. Evm. 801(a). See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDFCE § 246 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK].
2 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). The Hillmon doctrine
provides clarification and illumination of the state of mind exception. See note 5 infra. In
Hillmon, the Court observed that a person's state of mind may be ascertained only through
a person's manifestations, such as written or spoken words, gestures, or attitudes reflected
by the person. The Court ruled that a person's state of mind may be proven through the
testimony of a witness, based on the observation and interaction of the witness with that
person. 145 U.S. at 295.
3See McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 295 at 698.
' 28 U.S.C. (1976).
" FED. R. Evm. 803(3) provides that "[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state
of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief
to prove the fact remembered or believed. . . " is not excluded by the hearsay rule. FED.
R. EviD. 803. The Hillmon doctrine served as anincentive for the promulgation of Rule
803(3). See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra. See generally Note, The Hillmon Case-
Thirty-three Years After, 38 HARv. L. Ry. 709 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Thirty-three
Years After]. The state of mind exception permits the admission of statements into evi-
dence if the declarant's state of mind is at issue and the statements are probative of the
declarant's state of mind. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom., Inciso v. United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). See generally Rice, The State
of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A Response to "Secondary" Relevance, 14 DuQ. L.
REv. 219 (1976).
' See note 5 supra.,FEn. R. EvI. 802 prohibits the admission of hearsay into evidence
"except as provided by these rules [the Federal Rules of Evidence] . . .or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
7 FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 458 (1978).
Id. at 841.
,0 Id. A limiting instruction may be read to a jury for the purpose of restricting the use
of certain evidence. McCORMcK, supra note 1, § 59, at 135-36. Such an instruction may be
necessary to limit the use of an item of evidence if an inference may be made from the
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been exceeded in an abusive manner.
In Jenkins, a grand jury investigating possible narcotics violations by
Jerra Lyles and Beatrice Johnson," questioned the appellant, Jenkins.
2
Jenkins was asked specifically about his activities on July 26, 1975, when
agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) observed
him driving with Johnson in Lyles's neighborhood. 3 Jenkins testified that
he was attempting to visit a friend living in the same neighborhood as
Lyles, and that Johnson, who was along for the ride, remained in the
vehicle at all times." Testimony given by a DEA agent, however, contra-
dicted Jenkins's testimony, resulting in his recall by the grand jury. 5 Dur-
ing his second appearance Jenkins changed his testimony, admitting that
Johnson left the vehicle for a short period of time."5
On the basis of his conflicting testimony, the grand jury indicted Jen-
kins for perjury. 7 At his perjury trial, Jenkins advanced a third account
of his trip with Johnson to Lyles's neighborhood. 8 This third versionwas
consistent with his prior statements to the extent that he testified that
Johnson had never requested him to take her to Lyles's neighborhood and
that she had not initiated the trip in any way. 9 The prosecution then
offered the transcript of a telephone conversation between Lyles and John-
son that was intercepted by DEA agents prior to Jenkins's and Johnson's
evidence that is improper under the hearsay rule and no exception exists permitting the
evidence to be entered. Instead of disallowing the evidence completely, the court will admit
it, but only for a legitimate purpose under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.; see note 6 supra;
see, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 510 F.2d 606, 608-09 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Note, The Limiting
Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. Rsv. 264 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Effectiveness and Effect]; Note, Evidence Admissible For A Limited Purpose-The Risk Of
Confusion Upsetting The Balance Of Advantage, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 81 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Risk of Confusion].
1 Lyles was being investigated for a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1970)
(conspiracy to manufacture and distribute heroin) at the time the events leading to Jenkins's
appearance before the grand jury transpired. 579 F.2d at 841.
12 Jenkin's first appearance before the grand jury took place on September 24, 1975.
579 F.2d at 841.
13 Id.
" Jenkins testified that he was attempting to visit a friend in the 1300 block of North
Ellwood Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. Lyles's residence was in the 1200 block of North
Ellwood. Id. The opinion does not indicate whether such a friend existed. Id.
"1 The DEA agent testified that Johnson left the vehicle and entered Lyles's house. Id.
at 841-43.
11 Id. at 842. Jenkins testified that Johnson left the vehicle for approximately ten minutes
during his absence and that she returned after he was back in the van. Id. at 841-42.
'1 Jenkins was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976). At the time of the alleged perjury,
§ 1623 provided, in part, that any witness who, under oath, knowingly made a false material
declaration before any court or grand jury of the United States, would be punished by a fine
of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
Is At his perjury trial, Jenkins testified that he stopped to visit a friend in the 1300 block
of North Ellwood and that as he was leaving, Johnson asked him to stop in the 1200 block of
North Ellwood to allow her to visit other friends. Jenkins testified that he complied with her
request, waiting in the van until she returned. 579 F.2d at 842.
1' Id; see notes 14 & 18 supra.
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arrival at Lyles's residence." In that conversation, Johnson indicated that
she would meet Lyles "within the hour."'" The trial judge admitted the
transcript for the limited purpose of indicating Johnson's reason for mak-
ing the trip across town with Jenkins.? On the basis of this evidence, the
jury found Jenkins guilty of lying to the grand jury.?
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision to admit
the challenged transcript into evidence since the sole function of the tran-
script was to prove Johnson's mental state prior to departing for Lyles's
neighborhood.24 The court concluded that a jury could reasonably infer2
from this evidence that Johnson had asked Jenkins to drive her to Lyles's
residence, particularly since they arrived there shortly after Johnson's con-
versation with Lyles.2' Therefore, relying on such an inference, a jury could
properly conclude that Jenkins had lied in response to questions concern-
ing the purpose of his trip to Lyles's neighborhood.2
As a general rule, hearsay statements are not admissible as evidence,2
but if a hearsay statement falls within one of the exceptions to the general
rule, it may be admitted.29 Evaluation of the rationale and conclusions of
the Fourth Circuit initially requires an examination of the substance of the
offered conversation to determine if any part constitutes hearsay under the
Federal Rules of Evidence,30 and if so, whether any of the hearsay rule
exceptions are applicable.3' An out-of-court statement offered in court to
establish the truth of the matter asserted constitutes hearsay. 2 Thus,
Johnson's remark during the telephone conversation that she was on her
" 579 F.2d at 841. Agents intercepted the telephone conversation through the use of an
authorized wiretap. Id.
21 Id.
u Id. at 842. The trial judge instructed the jury that the conversation was admitted into
evidence only to show Johnson's reason for visiting the 1200 block of North Ellwood and not
to establish the truth of the matters contained in the conversation. See note 10 supra.
23 579 F.2d at 841.
2 Id. at 842. There is a contradiction in the Fourth Circuit's opinion regarding the
purpose of the evidence. Following a recitation of the trial court's instruction to the jury,
clearly setting forth the purpose of the evidence, id. at 842, the court stated that the sole
purpose of the proffer was to show the reasons for Jenkins's trip across town on July 26, 1975.
Id. at 844. Such a purpose is contrary to the limits imposed by the jury instruction and is
impermissible under Rule 803(3) since the intent of one other than the declarant is sought to
be established. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
25 579 F.2d at 842; see text accompanying notes 54 & 55 infra.
21 579 F.2d at 842.
2 Id; see text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
2 FED. R. Evw. 802; see note 6 supra.
2' FED. R. Evw. 802.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803, 804 (hearsay exceptions).
32 FED. R. Evm. 801(c). See generally note 1 supra. For a statement to constitute hearsay,
it must be offered to prove the truth of the statement. More specifically, the statement must
be used to establish the truth of the substance of what is stated, rather than merely to indicate
an attitude reflected by the statements. See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 246;
Note, Hearsay Evidence And The Federal Rules: Article WII-Mapping Out The Borders Of
Hearsay, 36 LA. L. Rav. 139, 142 & n.17 (1975).
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way to Lyles's residence constituted hearsay since the government offered
the statement as evidence to prove that she had the intent to go to Lyles's
residence and that she carried out her intent." The Fourth Circuit admit-
ted the statement, although hearsay, under the state of mind exception of
Rule 803,11 finding the statement indicative of Johnson's intention.'5
A critical examination of Rule 803(3) and its origin reveals the inappro-
priateness of the Fourth Circuit's application of the rule and hence, the
invalidity of the court's conclusion. Rule 803(3) encompasses a wide range
of specific types of statements which may be employed to establish a
declarant's mental, emotional or physical condition." The section of the
rule applicable to Jenkins deals with a statement of a declarant's mental
condition which consequently evidences the intent of the declarant 7 As
applied to Jenkins, the intent to be established by the use of Rule 803(3)
was the declarant Johnson's intention to meet Lyles at his residence.,
A stimulus for the promulgation of Rule 803(3)"9 was the Hilimon doc-
trine," which deals with the admissibility of statements made by a declar-
ant to establish the declarant's state of mind. In Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillmon,4' correspondence by a non-party to a lawsuit was admitted
into evidence to establish the author's intent to take a trip with a desig-
nated person.42 The correspondence aided the jury in finding that the au-
thor took the trip accompanied by the person named in the letters. 3 Since
such a finding would not have been possible without proof of the author's
intention, the correspondence was admitted into evidence to show that the
" 579 F.2d at 842-45. The prosecution's use of Johnson's statement to establish that she
went to Lyles's home, with the intent of going there, was hearsay since the prosecution sought
to prove the truth of the statement's substance. Thus, more than a mere effort to establish
an intent was reflected in the government's proffer of the evidence.
Id. at 842; see FED. R. EvID. 803(3); note 5 supra.
579 F.2d at 843.
n See note 5 supra.
31 See FED. R. EVID. 803(3); text accompanying notes 1-6 supra & 47-49 infra.
3 See notes 5, 34 & 36 supra.
3, FED. R. EVID. 803(3). See generally H. R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -'
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7087 [hereinafter cited as House
Report]. The House Committee clearly intended Rule 803(3) to limit the Hilimon doctrine
by admitting statements of a declarant only to prove the future conduct of the declarant and
not of another person. Id. But see United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 379-80 (9th Cir.
1976) (court declined to give effect to House Committee report).
40 See text accompanying notes 1-6 & note 39 supra.
" 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
I d. at 294-95. The question to be resolved in Hilimon was whether John Hilimon, the
plaintiff's husband had died. Id. at 294. The plaintiff attempted to collect proceeds from life
insurance policies on her husband's life. The insurance company maintained that Hillmon
had not died, but that another person, Walters, was the deceased. Id. The insurance company
sought to have letters written by Walters to his fiancee and sister admitted to show the
correspondent's intention to accompany Mr. Hillmon on an outing, and thus to prove that
the body found was that of Walters and not Hillmon. Id.
43 Id. at 296. The Court ruled that the letters should be admitted as evidence of the
correspondent's mental feelings. Id. The truth or falsity of the declarations was left as an
inquiry for the jury. Id.
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author intended to make the trip and to suggest that he carried out his
intention."4 The inference was drawn directly from the intent established
by the admitted correspondence. In applying the Hillmon analysis to the
conversation between Johnson and Lyles, the permissible use of the hear-
say statements becomes similarly ascertainable. 5 The hearsay portion of
the conversation between Johnson and Lyles may be admitted to show that
Johnson intended to go to Lyles's residence," but since Jenkins was not a
party to the conversation, his intention could not be derived from the
statements of others. 7 Proof of Johnson's intention to go to Lyles's home
had no relevance to whether she made her intention known to Jenkins or
whether Jenkins knew otherwise of her intention. The government's pur-
pose in offering the evidence was to support an inference that Johnson
asked Jenkins to drive her to Lyles's house." The court reasoned that if
this inference were accepted, a jury could find that Jenkins had lied when
he told the grand jury that he had no knowledge of Johnson's intention to
visit Lyles."0 Admittedly, the court's reasoning would be flawless but for
the fact that the intention established by the conversation was that of
Johnson rather than Jenkins.
Similarly, evaluation of the congressional purpose in promulgating the
state of mind exception clearly indicates that the statements made to Lyles
by Johnson during the telephone conversation cannot be used to show that
Jenkins intended to drive to Lyles's residence." Attributing such an intent
to Jenkins would conflict with the congressional intention of limiting the
Hillmon doctrine with the promulgation of Rule 803(3), providing that a
declarant's statement of intent would be admissible only to prove his fu-
ture conduct and not the future conduct of another person .5 Thus, while
Johnson's statements are admissible to show that she drove across town
" Id. at 295.
See 579 F.2d at 843; United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1975). In
Freeman, the testimony of witnesses which described the declarant's intention as the declar-
ant had related it to the witness, qualified as admissible hearsay under the state of mind
exception. The testimony was used to show the future intent of the declarant to perform an
act, the occurrence of which was in issue. Id. at 1190. See generally Thirty-three Years After,
supra note 5, at 715.
11 Under a literal reading of the state of mind exception, the statements of Johnson, as
the declarant, are clearly admissible to show her intent. FED. R. Evm. 803(3); see Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Randall, 532 F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1976) (declarations may be intro-
duced to show state of mind of the declarant at the time statements were made).
'v See FED. R. Evm. 803(3); note 39 supra.
" 579 F.2d at 842; see text accompanying notes 60-62 infra & note 24 supra.
" 579 F.2d at 842.
Allowing a statement of intent by a declarant to be introduced into evidence to prove
the performance of an act by another person clearly would be outside the confines of the state
of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Such a use would violate both the letter and spirit of
the rule as an exception to the general rule of hearsay exclusion. See FED. R. EviD. 802,803(3);
notes 5 & 39 supra; text accompanying note 74 infra.
" House Report, supra note 39, at 7087 (the intention of the House Committee was to
limit the use of a declarant's statements qualifying under Rule 803(3) to show that declarant's
intent).
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with the intention of going to Lyles's house, a comparable inference may
not be drawn with respect to Jenkins.2 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's
utilization of the Hillmon doctrine and Rule 803(3) resulted in the misap-
plication of each.
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Jenkins, other circuits had ap-
plied the Hillmon doctrine consistently with the congressional intent.53
Normally, hearsay statements admissible under the state of mind excep-
tion may be used to advance an inference that the declarant performed an
act as he had intended. 4 If the intention of the declarant necessarily in-
volves another person in the performance of the act, inferences also may
be drawn relating to the other person's actions or intent.5 However, the
circumstances of such a case require prudent analysis. 6 Before the state
52 See Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 394, 411 (1934)
(Hilmon Court allowed introduction of declarations of intent to prove intention, thus increas-
ing probability that intention was acted upon). See also United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d
76, 81 (2d Cir. 1978) (statement of intent deemed admissible to establish that prospective
act was performed). In Jenkins, the court appeared to be working backwards since the fact
that Jenkins drove to Lyles's neighborhood was established by independent evidence. 579
F.2d at 841. Thus, the existence of the precedent intention to carry out the act, rather than
the performance of the act, had to be proven. While Johnson's statements could be used to
show her intent, there is no justification for allowing those statements to stand as evidence
against Jenkins to establish his intent or motive at the time the act was performed.
53 See United States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 374-80 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1184, 1190
(10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Kaplan, 510 F.2d 606, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Demopoulos, 506 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975);
United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 761-82 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Blackburn v. Aetna Freight
Lines, Inc., 368 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1966).
" See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 (9th Cir. 1976). In Pheaster, the Ninth
Circuit had an opportunity to examine the Hillmon doctrine and to explore the inferential
potential of evidence admissible under the doctrine.
In Pheaster, hearsay testimony was admitted which was given by friends of Larry Adell,
the declarant concerning statements Adell had made regarding his intention to meet
"Angelo" at a Sambo's parking lot. Id. at 374-75. After Adell made the statements, he
disappeared. Id. Appellant Angelo Inciso objected to the use of this testimony, arguing that
the statements could not be used by a jury to conclude that Adell did meet Inciso at the
parking lot. Id. at 375. Inciso's objections primarily concerned the inference that must implic-
itly be drawn from Adell's statement of his intention; that is, that Inciso intended to meet
Adell in the parking lot, if the inference is to be made that Inciso was in the parking lot and
did in fact meet Adell. Id. at 377.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's admission of the testimony, basing its
decision on Hillmon. Id. at 376-80. The court reasoned that the state of mind of the declarant
does not have to be an actual issue in the case, but may be used to establish other matters
which are in issue. Id. at 376. Once an intention is shown, an inference may be drawn by a
finder of fact that the declarant carried out his intention and performed the act. Id. Pheaster
and Jenkins, however, may be distinguished. For Adell's intention to be fulfilled in Pheaster,
it was necessary that he meet Inciso, while in Jenkins, it was not necessary that Jenkins either
have any intention of going to Lyles's home or know of Johnson's intentions in order for
Johnson's intention to be fulfilled. In Pheaster, the appellant was implicated by the declar-
ant's statements of his intent, id. at 377, while in Jenkins there was no such implication. 579
F.2d at 841-42; see text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
544 F.2d at 376.
" The Ninth Circuit pointed out some objections to the Hillmon doctrine, including,
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of mind exception may be properly utilized, there must exist some connec-
tion between the performance of the act by the non-declarant and the state
of mind of the declarant.5 7 In the applicantion of Rule 803(3) by other
circuits, some mention of the non-declarant in the offered statements has
been requisite to its utilization. 5 The requisite connection between John-
son's state of mind and the actions or intent of Jenkins did not exist since
there was no reference to Jenkins in the conversation between Johnson and
Lyles." Johnson's clear intention to go to Lyles's residence "within the
hour"6 is not disputed. The conversation, however, did not suggest that
Jenkins had such an intention or that he had knowledge of Johnson's
intention.' In permitting Johnson's statements of her intent to support an
inference of how she effected her intent, thus implicating Jenkins, the
Fourth Circuit exceeded the limits of the Hillmon doctrine and Rule
803(3).62
In addition to a substantive analysis of Rule 803(3),"3 other circuits and
the Supreme Court have explored the efficacy of the "limited purpose"
jury instruction used in conjunction with evidence admitted as exceptions
to the hearsay rule." While recognizing that certain hearsay statements are
technically admissible to explain the the declarant's state of mind, practi-
cal deficiencies of the limiting instruction are exposed when the instruction
is presented to a jury. 5 To expect a jury to be able to isolate the state of
mind of a declarant from the actions of a defendant is indeed, unrealistic."
inter alia, the unreliability of inferences drawn from hearsay statements and, more impor-
tantly, the inconsistency of drawing inferences where they have no relation to the declarant's
then existing state of mind. Id. at 376-80. Although the Pheaster court concluded that the
testimony was properly admitted under the facts of that case, the court emphasized the
importance of careful consideration of these objections when implementing the Hillmon
doctrine. Id.
'T Id; see note 54 supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 343, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Demopoulos, 506 F.2d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 1974).
1, 579 F.2d at 841. Johnson did not say how she would travel to Lyles's residence nor
whether Jenkins would accompany her. Id.
90 Id.
61 Id.
61 FED. R. Evm. 803(3); see generally notes 2 & 39 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 50-62 supra.
' See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933); United States v. Kaplan,
510 F.2d 606, 608-09 & n.1 & 2 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 766-67
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
63 Recently, in United States v. Kaplan, 510 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit
evaluated the practical application of the Hillmon doctrine and the effectiveness of the
"limited purpose" instruction. Id. at 610. The court emphasized that the "overwhelmingly
probable misuse" of evidence by the jury in attempting to separate the permissible use of
the evidence from the non-permissible use was influential in disallowing the utilization of a
limiting instruction. Id. In Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933), Justice Cardozo
described the burden placed upon a jury when called upon to make subtle distinctions in the
use of evidence. He emphasized that the rules of evidence are framed for ordinary minds and
that when the risk of confusion threatens to upset the opportunity for fairness, the evidence
should not be admitted. Id.
11 See note 64 supra. See generally Effectivensss and Effect, supra note 10; Risk of
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Evaluation of such practical considerations with regard to Jenkins ex-
poses a possible indiscretion in admitting the telephone conversation. Al-
though the jury instruction at Jenkins's perjury trial was explicit with
regard to the purpose of the offered evidence, 7 requiring a jury to make
the necessary conceptual distinctions between the many inferences which
might be drawn from the evidence is burdensome. Since the Fourth Circuit
limited the use of the evidence under Rule 803(3) to show that Johnson
intended to go to Lyles's house and to support an inference that she ef-
fected such an intent, 8 the jury was required to distinguish the inference
that she effectuated her intent from the inference of how she effectuated
her intent. This task may have been impossible since the jurors were re-
quired to draw subtle distinctions without appropriate instructions from
the court. Since the inference of how Johnson effected her intent is beyond
the scope of Hillmon,69 the court should have been more cautious when
admitting the conversation into evidence. Even with the limiting instruc-
tion, the court should have foreseen the possibility that improper infer-
ences might be drawn from the conversation and thus should have denied
its admission. 0
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation and application of the Hillmon
doctrine unquestionably expands the limits of the doctrine beyond those
defined by Congress in the enactment of Rule 803(3)., The distortion and
abuse of Rule 803(3) is certain if the example of the Fourth Circuit is
followed. Using the rationale of Jenkins, hearsay statements may be ad-
mitted if they promote any inference relating to the intention of any person
to perform an act, regardless of whether there is a connection between the
declarant's state of mind and the actor's behavior.7" The Jenkins court
found that a connection to the action implied by a declarant's statements
of intent is sufficient to invoke Rule 803(3);73 a conclusion which com-
pletely disregards the congressional intent of that rule. Moreover, accept-
ance of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation is not desirable when recogniz-
ing that the rule is an exception to the general rule of hearsay exclusion. 74
Confusion, supra note 10.
17 579 F.2d at 842; see note 21 supra. See also note 9 supra.
" 579 F.2d at 843.
" See text accompanying note 68 supra.
o See note 10 supra. See generally United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The Brown court explored the purpose and efficacy of the limiting instruction, id. at 763, and
set forth a balancing test to be employed by a trial judge when counsel seeks to introduce
hearsay evidence under the state of mind exception accompanied by a limiting instruction
to the jury. Id. at 774. This test balances the relevance of the testimony against the prejudice
likely to befall the defendant. Id. The relevance of the evidence is dependent upon the
declarant's state of mind relating to a material issue in question and the statement itself must
be probative of the declarant's mental state. Id. Similarly, a determination of prejudice is
based upon the extent of harm or prejudice if the evidence is used, and the probability that
harm will occur. The probability of harm may be equated with the probability of jury misuse
as measured by the effectiveness of the limiting instruction. Id. at 775.
", See note 39 supra.
72 See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
11 579 F.2d at 842.
1 See notes 5 & 6 supra.
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